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THE ANTI–CROWD PLEASER: FIXING THE CROWDFUND
ACT’S HIDDEN RISKS AND INADEQUATE REMEDIES
ABSTRACT
A new form of startup financing is poised to turn the world of early-stage
financing on its head. The Crowdfund Act—part of the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act of 2012—will permit middle-class citizens to invest online in
startups for the first time. After the SEC finishes its rulemaking, equity
crowdfunding—modeled on the success of rewards-based crowdfunding
websites, such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo—will allow startups and eligible
small businesses to raise up to $1 million over a twelve-month period by
issuing equity shares to mom-and-pop retail investors through online “funding
portals.”
A swelling tide of scholarship, media reports, and security industry
publications warns about the risk of fraud inherent in the online selling of
equity shares in startups to unsophisticated investors. However, this literature
largely omits discussion of the problems with the new civil liability provision
included in the Crowdfund Act—an express private action provision that will
raise the transaction costs of crowdfunding and ensnare unwary issuers in its
liability trap. In an attempt to address the fraud concern, Congress drafted this
new civil liability provision as well as a detailed and extensive set of disclosure
requirements for issuers to navigate. The new liability provision, which
broadens the language of Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,
imposes liability on the issuer and its officers and directors for false or
misleading statements or omissions in any written or oral communication. A
plaintiff need only prove that an untrue statement or misleading omission
occurred and that the defendant did not exercise reasonable care, even if loss
causation, reliance, and scienter are not shown.
This Comment analyzes the hidden transaction costs in the Crowdfund Act,
particularly the severe liability cost this provision imposes on issuers.
Crowdfunded offerings present a new environment in which innocent but
inexperienced entrepreneurs face increased risk of making a misstatement or
misleading omission. Crowdfunded offerings confront a number of issues not
faced by mature companies making public offerings, including the high failure
rate of startups, the difficulty of working with emerging technology, the
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entrepreneurial psychological predisposition to risk, a lack of sophisticated
disclosure assistance, and a dearth of due diligence.
This Comment argues that the new liability provision not only will sweep
too broadly—indiscriminately catching negligent entrepreneurs and fraudsters
in its swath—but will also fail to provide an effective remedy for defrauded
investors. Given the relatively small amount of money in play in a crowdfunded
offering and the expense and difficulty of bringing a class action securities
lawsuit, plaintiffs’ attorneys are unlikely to pursue cases involving fraudulent
behavior. This Comment concludes that the best solution to both issues is to
impose scienter as an element of the civil liability provision while also
awarding attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs’ attorneys successful on the merits at
trial. This solution will decrease the up-front and hidden transaction costs for
issuers and will incentivize plaintiffs’ attorneys to pursue issuers committing
fraud. Finally, this solution continues the SEC’s goal of balancing securities
regulations to protect investors and the integrity of the market, while keeping
transaction costs low enough to maintain the utility of the market as this
revolutionary experiment in startup financing takes root.
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INTRODUCTION
When startup Pebble Technology founder Eric Migicovsky needed
additional funding to take his invention, a “smartwatch” that pairs with
smartphones and runs apps, from prototype to production, he started off on the
traditional road—he pitched his idea to the established venture capital firms in
Silicon Valley.1 But, as is frequently the case, the traditional venture capital
firms turned Migicovsky down.2 Migicovsky’s startup then took a new, but
increasingly common, approach: it turned to “the crowd” for funding. In April
2012, Pebble Technology posted a funding pitch on Kickstarter, a
crowdfunding website, estimating delivery of a Pebble Watch by September to
each person who contributed $115 or more to the venture.3 Pebble Technology
set its funding goal at $100,000.4 Within about twenty-eight hours, Pebble
Technology had raised $1 million.5 Within thirty-seven days, Pebble
Technology had raised $10,266,845—more than 102 times its goal—without
ceding any ownership in the company to investors.6
The biggest problem for crowdfunded ventures, such as Pebble
Technology? Living up to their own promises. Pebble Technology shipped the
first of its black smartwatches in late January 2013, missing its estimated
delivery date by four months.7 Most of Pebble Technology’s color
smartwatches shipped during spring 2013, although supporters that ordered
white smartwatches were still awaiting delivery in July 20138 Even with this
delay of more than ten months for certain smartwatch backers, Pebble
Technology actually came closer to meeting its estimated delivery date than
many large crowdfunded projects on Kickstarter.9 This problem—failing to
1 See Joanna Stern, Pebble Watch: Behind the Smartwatch Sensation, ABC NEWS (July 11, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/pebble-watch-smartwatch-iphone-android/story?id=16750944#.UGYH4W
Bt_80.
2 See id.
3 See Pebble Tech., Pebble: E-Paper Watch for iPhone and Android, KICKSTARTER, http://www.
kickstarter.com/projects/597507018/pebble-e-paper-watch-for-iphone-and-android?ref=live (last visited Aug.
13, 2013).
4 See id.
5 Pebble Tech., $1mm in 28 Hours, Update to Pebble: E-Paper Watch for iPhone and Android,
KICKSTARTER (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/597507018/pebble-e-paper-watch-foriphone-and-android/posts?page=9.
6 See Pebble Tech., supra note 3.
7 See ETA (Estimated Time of Arrival), GET PEBBLE, http://help.getpebble.com/customer/portal/articles/
1020569-eta-estimated-time-of-arrival (last updated July 9, 2013).
8 Id.
9 See Matt Krantz, Crowd Funding’s Dark Side; Sometimes Investments Just Swirl Down the Drain,
USA TODAY, Aug. 15, 2012, at 1B.
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achieve production timetables and delivery promises—is endemic among
technology startups on Kickstarter and exemplifies the risks and obstacles
startups face.10
Despite these issues, crowdfunding possesses enormous potential for
revolutionizing startup financing and jumpstarting the lagging U.S. economy.11
Kickstarter is an example of a reward crowdfunding site where donors receive
rewards, such as products or small perks, in exchange for donations as seen in
the Pebble Watch story. Now, a new type of crowdfunding is in the works—
equity crowdfunding. In the spring of 2012, Congress passed, and President
Obama signed, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act).12
A central provision in the JOBS Act, Title III: Capital Raising Online While
Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012 (Crowdfund Act),
mandates that the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgate rules
creating a registration exemption to the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)
for crowdfunded offerings sold to retail investors, meaning individual, small
investors, via registered online funding portals or brokers.13 In equity
crowdfunding, the investor receives equity, meaning a share of the company,
instead of simply a reward or product.14 Until the SEC promulgates these
rules—most likely in early 2014—equity crowdfunding will remain illegal.15
Securities regulations do not apply to reward crowdfunding sites, such as
Kickstarter, which allows them to operate sans SEC oversight.16 But what if a
Pebble Watch scenario occurred in the forthcoming SEC-regulated equity
crowdfunding? Thanks to the new civil liability provision in the JOBS Act,
Eric Migicovsky and Pebble Technology would be on the hook for all the
10

See infra notes 230–34 and accompanying text.
See John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin, and
Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 594 (2013) (describing the
“revolutionary power of Internet crowdfunding”).
12 See Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama to Sign Jumpstart Our
Business Startups (JOBS) Act (Apr. 5, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/
04/05/president-obama-sign-jumpstart-our-business-startups-jobs-act.
13 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302, 126 Stat. 306, 315–21 (2012).
14 See Wroldsen, supra note 11, at 588–89. Unless otherwise noted, all further references to
“crowdfunding” are to equity crowdfunding, which is the primary concern of this Comment.
15 See Robb Mandelbaum, ‘Crowdfunding’ Rules Are Unlikely to Meet Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,
2012, at B1. All securities, including shares of a company using equity crowdfunding, must be registered with
the SEC or satisfy a registration exemption before they can be sold. See id. Registering securities under
Section 5 of the Securities Act is prohibitively expensive for startups, and none of the other registration
exemptions fits equity crowdfunding. See infra Part I.B.
16 See infra Part I.A–B for an explanation of rewards crowdfunding and the inapplicability of current
securities regulations.
11
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money raised, plus interest, if Migicovsky or any Pebble Technology officer,
director, or partner made a material misstatement or omission in a written or
oral communication to the SEC or to Pebble Technology’s investors.17 This
liability applies even if the misrepresentation was “merely negligent, not
intentional,”18 such as setting the September 2012 shipping date, for example.
This Comment will closely examine the new civil liability provision in the
JOBS Act.
The JOBS Act is, as its name suggests, intended to jumpstart economic
development and job creation by easing restrictions on startups seeking to raise
capital.19 Based on the obvious and inevitable risk of fraud inherent in an
online funding system involving unsophisticated investors,20 Congress drafted
detailed, extensive, and complicated disclosure requirements for issuers using
crowdfunding.21 These hurdles will increase the transaction costs associated
with raising a relatively small sum of money through crowdfunding.22 Along
with the substantive disclosure requirements, Congress also drafted a new
liability provision—referred to as Section 4A(c) throughout this Comment—
that borrows almost verbatim from the language of Section 12(a)(2) of the
Securities Act.23 Section 12(a)(2), at least in theory, imposes civil liability on
issuers for false or misleading statements or omissions in an oral statement or
in a prospectus for a public offering.24 This Comment argues that Section
4A(c) sweeps too broadly, raises further the already high transaction costs in

17

See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302(b).
See C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfilled, 40 SEC.
REG. L. J. 195, 217 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2066088.
19 See Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 12.
20 See Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities Laws—
Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735,
1767–69 (2012); Lyndon M. Tretter, Crowdfunding: Small-business Incubator or Securities Fraud
Accelerator? 18 WL J. SEC. LITIG. & REG., no. 8, Aug. 21, 2012 at 1, 1, available at 2012 WL 3580266; Skip
Kaltenheuser, Legislating to Create the Next Enron, IBA NET, http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?
ArticleUid=1542A41C-C561-474A-B057-18696C22BDE0 (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
21 See Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64
FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1438–40 (2012).
22 See infra Part II.
23 See Bradford, supra note 18, at 210–11.
24 Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012). Although crowdfunding does not
permit trading on the public markets, a crowdfunded offering shares several characteristics with an initial
public offering (IPO). See Antone Johnson, The Great Crowdfunding Train Wreck of 2013, GUST BLOG (Mar.
19, 2012), http://gust.com/angel-investing/startup-blogs/2012/03/19/crowdfunding-train-wreck/. Crowdfunding, likewise,
makes equity shares in a business available in relatively small dollar amounts to a large number of retail
investors. See id. (explaining that crowdfunding “sounds virtually identical” to an IPO).
18
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crowdfunding, provides an ineffective remedy for investors, and needs a
rewrite to properly fit the new crowdfunding model for startup financing.
Although it is easy to point a finger at Congress for poor or rushed
drafting,25 the roots of the problems with Section 4A(c) run much deeper.
Crowdfunding inverts the traditional finance system for non-registered
offerings.26 Instead of raising a large sum of money from a small number of
institutional investors or accredited investors27 in a private placement
offering,28 crowdfunding raises this sum from a large number of
unsophisticated retail investors.29 The Crowdfund Act’s rehashing of Section
12(a)(2)’s “express private cause of action”30 into Section 4A(c) simply does
not fit the crowdfunding environment, especially given crowdfunding’s
heightened risk of material misstatements and already steep transaction costs.
As the proverb goes, you can’t put new wine into an old wineskin.

25

See infra Part I.C.
See Letter from William Francis Galvin, Sec’y of the Commonwealth, Commonwealth of Mass., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Aug. 8, 2012), available at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctpdf/Jobs_
Act0001.pdf (“Crowdfunding represents a significant departure from long-established rules for public
offerings of securities.”).
27 An “accredited investor” is, inter alia, “a natural person with income exceeding $200,000 in each of
the two most recent years or joint income with a spouse exceeding $300,000 for those years.” Accredited
Investors, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/answers/accred.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
28 Private placements are securities offerings sold outside of the normal public securities markets. See
Jennifer J. Johnson, Fleecing Grandma: A Regulatory Ponzi Scheme, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 993, 995
(2012). Although Rules 505 and 506 of Regulation D allow selling securities to thirty-five non-accredited
investors in a private placement, most issuers do not do so to avoid triggering extensive disclosure
requirements. See infra note 107 and accompanying text; see also Johnson, supra note 24. Moreover, although
Rule 504 of Regulation D does not limit the number of non-accredited investors, it also does not preempt state
law registration requirements, which may in turn impose strict limitations on the number of non-accredited
investors permitted. See infra note 108 and accompanying text; see also Alexander J. Davie, Can a Friends
and Family Round Include Non-Accredited Investors? Should It? STRICTLY BUS. L. BLOG (Aug. 15, 2011),
http://www.strictlybusinesslawblog.com/2011/08/15/can-a-friends-and-family-round-include-non-accreditedinvestors-should-it/.
29 See Paul Belleflamme et al., Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd 2 (Ctr. for Operations Research
& Econometrics, Discussion Paper No. 2011/32, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1578175. Currently, several platforms, including AngelList, FundersClub, and MicroVentures, are
using crowdfunding to raise money from accredited angel investors. See Sarah E. Needleman & Lora Kolodny,
Site Unseen: More ‘Angels’ Invest via Internet—Risks Abound, but Investors Search for Promising Startups,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2013, at B1. Although this variation on equity crowdfunding shows great promise for
untethering angel investors from traditional finance hotspots, such as New York City, Boston, and San
Francisco, these platforms essentially just move traditional angel investor financing into online communities.
See id.; see also infra note 79. This Comment is primarily concerned with equity crowdfunding involving
retail investors, not angels.
30 Jennifer J. Johnson, Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud: Gatekeepers in State Court, 36 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 463, 472 (2011).
26
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If the Crowdfund Act is to achieve its acronymistic goal of “Capital
Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-disclosure,”31
Congress must revisit and rewrite Section 4A(c). As currently written, Section
4A(c) creates liability for the issuer if a plaintiff can prove the issuer made a
verbal or written material misstatement or omission of a fact that makes other
facts misleading and can show any investment loss, so long as that plaintiff did
not know of the untruth or omission.32 Section 4A(c) does not require the
plaintiff to prove scienter, loss causation, or reliance, and provides only two
weak affirmative defenses for the issuer.33
As this Comment shows, crowdfunding’s circumstances will create a
perfect liability trap for “innocent but unsophisticated entrepreneurs”34 and will
also drive up the transaction costs for entrepreneurs aware of the severe
liability risk associated with what they write and say. To avoid both punishing
uninformed entrepreneurs and ratcheting crowdfunding’s transaction costs
even higher, Congress should rewrite Section 4A(c) to require the plaintiff to
prove scienter—either intentionality or recklessness—before liability will
attach. But, in order to better encourage civil fraud policing, Section 4A(c) also
should be revised to allow attorney fee-shifting for plaintiffs’ attorneys, which
will help justify the costs of pursuing litigation over the relatively small sums
of money involved in crowdfunding.35 Since the maximum amount that an
issuer can raise under the Crowdfund Act during any twelve-month period is
$1 million,36 the financial incentive to pursue class action litigation on a
contingent fee basis is minimal, which puts investors at risk of having a right
without a remedy. Of course, Rule 10b-5—the most famous anti-fraud civil
liability provision—will apply to crowdfunded offerings.37 However, the
barriers to bringing a claim under Rule 10b-5, including clearing the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure’s heightened specificity standards and proving
scienter, reliance, and loss causation, will largely negate the effectiveness of
this liability provision, especially given the small sum of money in play.38

31

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306, 319 (2012).
33 See id.; see also infra notes 205–10 and accompanying text.
34 Bradford, supra note 18, at 198.
35 The Crowdfund Act places strict investment caps on individual investors. See infra note 279 and
accompanying text.
36 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302(a).
37 See Hazen, supra note 20, at 1757.
38 See id. at 1757–58.
32
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This Comment’s prescriptive solution borrows the scienter element of Rule
10b-5 and integrates it into Section 4A(c), creating a hybrid provision that
protects issuers from liability for beginner’s mistakes but holds fraudulent
issuers accountable via Section 4A(c)’s express cause of action, coupled with
attorney fee-shifting. This recommendation establishes a better balance
between issuer liability risk and investor protection from fraud—a perennial
seesaw that is currently off-balance for both issuers and investors in
crowdfunded offerings. Since fraud will almost inevitably occur,39 a strong
liability provision is needed. However, the right balance must take into account
the steep transaction costs and heightened liability risk for inadvertent mistakes
by issuers while still protecting investors from fraud. This Comment’s solution
attempts to strike that balance.
Although a few scholars have written about drafting errors and other
shortcomings of the Crowdfund Act,40 no one has written in more than passing
detail about the problems with Section 4A(c), especially in regards to the
provision’s effects on transaction costs, heavy-handedness toward inadvertent
mistakes by entrepreneurs, and potential ineffectiveness as a remedy. This
Comment seeks to fill that void and provide a prescriptive solution to these
problems.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of crowdfunding’s
development. Section A focuses on the evolution of crowdfunding, including
the different crowdfunding models, the success and proliferation of rewardsbased crowdfunding websites, and crowdfunding’s avoidance of securities
regulations under the Howey test. Section B explores the significant funding
gap startups face due to banks’ reluctance to extend credit and the selectivity of
angel investors and venture capital firms. Section B also discusses the
inapplicability of other SEC registration exemptions to crowdfunding.
Section C tracks the legislative history of the Crowdfund Act and highlights
how additional disclosure requirements and Section 4A(c) were layered onto
the Crowdfund Act in the name of protecting investors from fraud.
39 For example, the North American Securities Administrators Association has already identified about
200 crowdfunding website names that appear suspicious and state regulators are taking or considering taking
enforcement action against “a handful of companies for allegedly exploiting online fundraising to commit
fraud.” See Jean Eaglesham, Crowdfunding Efforts Draw Suspicion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2013, at C1. This
concern emphasizes the need for a strong liability provision, such as the one proposed, but not a provision that
unduly exposes honest but inexperienced issuers to stark liability.
40 See generally Bradford, supra note 18 (analyzing the requirements of the Crowdfund Act and
discussing its flaws); Cohn, supra note 21 (comparing the new crowdfunding exemption to other exemptions
and criticizing its complexity).

MASHBURN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

9/24/2013 12:10 PM

THE ANTI–CROWD PLEASER

135

Next, Part II outlines the requirements imposed on issuers trying to raise
funds through the Crowdfund Act. It also explains how the up-front transaction
costs of crowdfunding, including accountant, attorney, and funding portal fees,
coupled with crowdfunding’s hidden costs, may outweigh its benefits as a form
of financing for early-stage companies.
In Part III, this Comment contrasts liability provision Section 12(a)(2) of
the Securities Act with Section 4A(c) of the Crowdfund Act in detail.
Section A examines the past application of Section 12(a)(2) in securities
litigation and looks at the causes of its diminishing role. Section B explores
how Congress tweaked the language of Section 12(a)(2) to drastically expand
Section 4A(c)’s reach in the Crowdfund Act. In addition, section B.1 discusses
the myriad reasons startups confront significantly higher liability risk in the
crowdfunding environment under Section 4A(c) than more mature
corporations confront when selling securities on the capital markets under
Sections 11 and 12(a)(2). Section B.2 then addresses the concern that
plaintiffs’ attorneys will be deterred from litigating crowdfunding suits because
of the relatively minor sums of money at stake and the expense and difficulty
of litigating securities class action lawsuits unless brought in anticipation of a
quick settlement.
Finally, Part IV presents recommendations for rewriting Section 4A(c).
Part IV first explains the need to add scienter as an element to avoid catching
innocent but unsophisticated entrepreneurs in a liability trap and to prevent
further escalation of the transaction costs in crowdfunding. Part IV then
discusses the benefits of adding a fee-shifting provision to Section 4A(c),
which would incentivize plaintiffs’ attorneys to pursue litigation on behalf of
defrauded investors, thereby ensuring that the most culpable issuers can be
held accountable and, hopefully, deterred from initially committing fraud. This
crowdfunding-specific liability provision will balance investor protection
against the equally urgent need to reduce the hidden transaction costs
associated with this groundbreaking form of startup financing.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF CROWDFUNDING
To understand the problems with Crowdfund Act Section 4A(c), it is first
necessary to briefly consider the background of crowdfunding, including the
evolution of crowdfunding, its ability to plug the startup capital funding gap,
and the legislative history of the Crowdfund Act.
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A. The Evolution of Crowdfunding
Crowdfunding occurs when someone raises small amounts of money from
a large group of people, facilitated via the Internet and, particularly, through
social media platforms.41 Internet-based crowdfunding is still in its infancy;42
the term “crowdfunding” does not even appear in the print version of the
Oxford English Dictionary.43 Crowdfunding has its roots in “crowdsourcing,”
which refers more broadly to the efforts of the general public, i.e., “the crowd,”
to solve a problem or address an issue,44 such as designing T-shirts, fixing bugs
in software, or developing a new algorithm for Netflix recommendations.45
The primary problem solved by the crowd in crowdfunding is a lack of
capital, a frequent and serious concern for startups.46 Crowdfunding models
usually take three forms: (1) donation or rewards crowdfunding,47 (2)
crowdfunding loans,48 and (3) equity or revenue sharing crowdfunding.49 Early
adopters of crowdfunding, including musicians, filmmakers, citizen journalists,
and political candidates, relied on their popularity to directly solicit funds from

41

See Bradford, supra note 18, at 196.
See Edan Burkett, A Crowdfunding Exemption? Online Investment Crowdfunding and U.S. Securities
Regulation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 63, 71 (2011).
43 Julia Groves, A $2.8bn Global Concept That’s Not yet in the Dictionary, PIONEERS POST (Sept. 4,
2013), http://www.pioneerspost.com/news/20130409/28bn-global-concept-thats-not-yet-the-dictionary. To be
fair, “crowdfunding” is in the online version of the Oxford English Dictionary. Crowdfunding, OXFORD
DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/crowdfunding (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
44 See Hazen, supra note 20, at 1736.
45 See Nikki D. Pope, Crowdfunding Microstartups: It’s Time for the Securities and Exchange
Commission to Approve a Small Offering Exemption, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 973, 976–77 (2011).
46 See infra Part I.B.
47 This category can be broken down into three related subcategories, depending on what the funder
receives in return for his or her contribution: (1) a strictly donation-based model where, for example, the
funder of a band making an album does not receive anything; (2) a nominal rewards model where, for
example, the funder receives a thank-you in the album’s liner notes or a poster of the band’s album cover; and
(3) a pre-purchase model where, for example, the funder receives a copy of the album once it is released. See
D. Scott Freed, Crowdfunding as a Platform for Raising Small Business Capital, MD. B.J. July/August 2012,
at 13.
48 Although a great deal could be written about crowdfunding loans or the related topic of microlending,
that subject lies outside the scope of this Comment. For more information, see generally Andrew Verstein, The
Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445, 445 (2011), offering a proposal of a
regulatory scheme aimed to preserve the “innovative mix of social finance, microlending, and
disintermediation” involved in person-to-person lending.
49 See Crowdfunding, CROWDSOURCING.ORG, http://www.crowdsourcing.org/community/crowdfunding/
7 (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
42
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followers via their own websites or through social media platforms, such as
Facebook and Twitter, without using dedicated intermediary websites.50
The appearance of intermediary websites, such as Indiegogo in early 2008
and Kickstarter in 2009, catalyzed the popularity of rewards crowdfunding by
helping people without a built-in following access the crowd.51 These
intermediary websites essentially act as matchmakers between people seeking
funding and people interested in donating funds.52 Within the last six years,
more than 350 new rewards crowdfunding platforms have appeared,53
including niche platforms for teenagers,54 gamers,55 and even those in the
“funeral profession.”56
Why all the interest in crowdfunding? Enormous sums of money are in
play. As of August 2013, Kickstarter alone had successfully raised more than
$744 million for companies and individuals.57 In 2012, crowdfunding
platforms in the aggregate reportedly raised approximately $2.8 billion
worldwide.58 The sum is likely to grow once the SEC issues its regulations and
equity crowdfunding legally commences. Senator Jeff Merkley, the sponsor of
an influential crowdfunding bill,59 speculated that if Americans move just 1%
of their retirement savings to crowdfunding, “[t]he result would be $170 billion
of investment in our startups and small businesses,” which would be
“extraordinarily powerful.”60
50

See Burkett, supra note 42, at 71; see also Yoichiro Taku, Crowdfunding: Its Practical Effect May Be
Unclear Until SEC Rulemaking Is Complete, BUS. L. TODAY (May 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/
blt/content/2012/05/article-03-taku.pdf.
51 See Malika Zouhali-Worrall, Buddy, Can You Spare a C-Note? A Field Guide to Crowdfunding, INC.,
Nov. 2011, at 114.
52 See Burkett, supra note 42, at 68, 71.
53 See The New Thundering Herd, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2012, at 71.
54 See CrowdfundingKids.com Launches Crowdfunding Site for U.S. Teens, SF GATE (Sept. 26, 2012,
7:01 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/prweb/article/CrowdfundingKids-com-Launches-CrowdfundingSite-3895135.php.
55 See Dean Takahashi, Gambitious Launches Crowdfunding Platform for Video Games Only, VENTURE
BEAT (Sept. 24, 2012, 11:00 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2012/09/24/gambitious-launches-crowdfundingplatform-for-video-games-only/.
56 See SoFund.Us: The World’s First Crowdfunding Platform Dedicated to the Funeral Profession, YOU
TUBE (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U9BYrhQOcb0.
57 See Kickstarter Stats, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats (last visited Aug. 13,
2013).
58 See Kurt Wagner, Waiting to Sow the Seed Funding, CNN MONEY (Dec. 28, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://
tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/12/28/crowdfunding-jobs-act/?iid=SF_F_River.
59 See infra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.
60 158 CONG. REC. S1829 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2012) (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley). Similarly, the CEO
of EarlyShares.com, Maurice Lopes, relies on Amy Cortese, the author of Locavesting: The Revolution in

MASHBURN GALLEYSPROOFS2

138

9/24/2013 12:10 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:127

Current crowdfunding websites, including Indiegogo and Kickstarter,
maintain a strictly rewards-based model—donation, nominal reward, or prepurchase—to avoid running afoul of the Securities Act.61 Section 5 of the
Securities Act requires either the registration of securities or an applicable
exemption from registration before any securities are sold to investors.62
Rather than defining “security” outright, the Securities Act lists a variety of
financial instruments that qualify as a security, including an “investment
contract,”63 which is the historically broad “catch-all category.”64 Thus,
whether a crowdfunding venture is subject to securities regulation hinges on
whether the financial instrument in question is an investment contract.65
Because the Securities Act fails to define “investment contract,” courts
have long looked to the Supreme Court’s seminal Howey test for guidance.66
The Howey test defines an investment contract as “a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led
to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”67
Under the Howey test, reward crowdfunding, including the pre-purchase
model, does not create an investment contract because the person donating
does not “expect profits.”68 Because reward crowdfunding involves no
anticipation of a return on investment, U.S. securities laws are not implicated
and neither registration nor exemption requirements must be satisfied.69
Current crowdfunding platforms in the United States are rewards-based,
and there is no doubt that sponsors of the equity crowdfunding legislation
modeled several provisions of the Crowdfund Act off Kickstarter and
Local Investing and How to Profit from It, who, according to Lopes, explains that “if Americans shift just 1
percent of their $30 trillion in long-term investments to small businesses, it would equal more than 10 times
the venture capital invested in all of 2011.” See Lou Carlozo, With Crowdfunding, Experts Urge Caution
Before Businesses Raise Funds, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/01/us-jobscrowdfunding-idUSBRE87014U20120801.
61 See Pope, supra note 45, at 978. See supra note 47 for a description of the three rewards-based model
subcategories.
62 See Bradford, supra note 18, at 196; see also Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1)
(2012).
63 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
64 C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 30
(2012).
65 See Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and
the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 886 (2011).
66 See id.
67 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
68 See Burkett, supra note 42, at 80.
69 See id.
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Indiegogo, the leading reward crowdfunding platforms.70 For example,
Kickstarter releases collected funds to the campaign creator only if a preset
funding target is reached.71 If the target is not reached, the money is
refunded.72 The Crowdfund Act specifically requires the use of either
registered brokers or website intermediaries—referred to as “funding
portals”—and, likewise, permits the release of funds only “when the aggregate
capital raised from all investors is equal to or greater than a target offering
amount.”73 However, the Crowdfund Act caps the aggregate amount that any
issuer can raise at $1 million per twelve-month period, whereas Kickstarter and
Indiegogo do not impose a cap.74
B. The Startup Capital Funding Gap
Crowdfunding presents at least four potential advantages for startups over
traditional early-stage financing methods. For starters, crowdfunding helps the
young company create a prelaunch community around its product.75 People
who provide financing, especially as an investment, are more likely to promote
and support the company and its product because they stand to benefit from the
company’s success.76 Second, crowdfunding is a way to test the market’s
appetite for a product at an early stage in the commercialization process.77
Third, crowdfunding facilitates raising capital from any location in the country,
rather than tying entrepreneurs to traditional “angel investor”78 and venture

70 See 158 CONG. REC. S1828 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2012) (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley); see also The
New Thundering Herd, supra note 53. The SEC also requested data from Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and
RocketHub to help the SEC with drafting regulations. See Mandelbaum, supra note 15.
71 Kickstarter Basics: Kickstarter 101, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter%
20basics (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
72 Id.
73 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306, 315–16
(2012). Indiegogo, on the other hand, allows users to pay a higher fee but collect raised funds even if the target
goal is not reached. See How Pricing Works on Indiegogo, INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/howpricing-works-on-indiegogo (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
74 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302(a); see Learn How to Raise Money for an Idea,
INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/learn-how-to-raise-money-for-a-campaign (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
As of this writing, 42 projects have raised more than $1 million on Kickstarter. See Kickstarter Stats, supra
note 57.
75 See Belleflamme et al., supra note 29, at 5.
76 See id. at 28.
77 See Pope, supra note 45, at 1002.
78 Angel investors are wealthy individuals, typically with an entrepreneurial background. See Johnson,
supra note 28, at 998.
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capital hotspots, such as Northern California, New York City, and Boston.79
Fourth and most critically, as this section discusses, crowdfunding provides an
alternative source of financing that could help plug the capital gap facing
startups.
It is no secret that small businesses often face a difficult time raising money
through traditional financing sources, such as bank loans, angel investors, and
venture capital firms.80 Estimates suggest that the financial markets fall $60
billion short of the demand for early-stage private equity financing each year.81
This capital funding gap is particularly pronounced for startup companies.82
Startups rarely have sufficient cash flow or collateral to qualify for bank
loans,83 especially given the tightened underwriting standards imposed by
banks following the 2007 financial crisis.84 Venture capital firms are highly
selective and provide only limited assistance to startups, investing on average
less than a quarter of their total investments in early-stage companies, for two
main reasons.85 First, venture capital firms primarily look to invest larger
sums—on average between $2 million and $10 million—than startup
companies are seeking.86 Second, venture capital firms prefer investing in
slightly less risky companies—those that have survived the initial startup phase
and have proven track records and clearer exit opportunities.87
Data also show that angel investors, the traditional source of capital for
startup companies, are investing in companies closer to commercialization than
in the past.88 In 2008, 2009, and 2010, angels reduced their investment in the
“seed stage” of companies.89 Brian Batchelor, an attorney in Atlanta, Georgia,
79 See Ryan Tate, Feds to Break Up Tech’s Investor Party, WIRED (Aug. 21, 2012, 2:16 PM), http://
www.wired.com/business/2012/08/SEC-tech-investors/.
80 See Bradford, supra note 64, at 100–01; see also Burkett, supra note 42, at 63.
81 Bradford, supra note 64, at 100 (quoting William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It’s Time to
Allow General Solicitation and Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004)).
82 See id.
83 See id. at 102.
84 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2012 SURVEY OF
CREDIT UNDERWRITING PRACTICES 7–8 (2012). As of May 2012, only 10.2% of small businesses that applied
for bank loans received them. See Carlozo, supra note 60.
85 See Bradford, supra note 64, at 102. Venture capitalists turn down 99% of applicants. See id. at 103.
86 Id. at 102.
87 See Pope, supra note 45, at 973–74.
88 See id. at 994 (noting that “angel investment in startups has declined steadily since 2007”).
89 See id. at 994–95. Jeffrey Sohl, Director of the University of New Hampshire Center for Venture
Research, stated, “This decrease in seed/start-up stage and first sequence investing is of concern.” Press
Release, The Univ. of N.H., Angel Investor Market Rebounds in 2010, UNH Center for Venture Research
Finds Total Investment Increases 14 Percent from 2000 (Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://www.unh.edu/
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who formerly worked with the Atlanta Technology Angels, says, “Since 2008,
what a venture capitalist or angel is looking at is going further down the road
in terms of ideas and development.”90 The Center for Venture Research’s 2012
angel investor market report concluded, “This decrease in [investments in the]
seed/start-up stage is of concern since that is the stage of need for our nation’s
entrepreneurs.”91 In addition, scholars and attorneys in the field estimate that
only 1%–3% of funding applicants actually receive funds from angel
investors.92
Even before progressing to the angel pitching stage, many entrepreneurs
are forced to personally finance or bootstrap their startups by using their own
fund reserves, taking out additional mortgages, or maxing out their credit
cards.93 Most entrepreneurs also turn to family and friends for financing in the
early stages,94 which can create problems down the road when securities are
prepared for registration.95
U.S. capital markets also fail to provide any relief for startups seeking to
raise capital. The burdens of registering securities are “legendary.”96 The
registration statement filed with the SEC requires the assistance of attorneys,
accountants, and underwriters, and the registration price tag can exceed a few

news/cj_nr/2011/apr/lw12funds.cfm. Seed and startup capital investment improved slightly in 2011, although
it decreased again to about 2010 levels in 2012. See Jeffrey Sohl, The Angel Investor Market in 2012: A
Moderating Recovery Continues, CTR. FOR VENTURE RESEARCH, Apr. 25, 2013, available at http://
paulcollege.unh.edu/sites/default/files/2012_analysis_report.pdf.
90 Telephone Interview with Brian Batchelor, Associate Attorney, formerly with Atlanta Technology
Angels (Sept. 28, 2012).
91 Sohl, supra note 89.
92 See Pope, supra note 45, at 995 (“Less than three percent of the thousands of entrepreneurs seeking
funding from angel investors actually get funding . . . .”); Telephone Interview with Brian Batchelor, supra
note 90 (explaining that around 1–3% of applicants to Atlanta Technology Angels receive funding);
Probability of Success in Raising Angel Capital, BILL PAYNE (June 7, 2011), http://billpayne.com/2011/06/07/
probability-of-success-in-raising-angel-capital.html (concluding that “probably about 2% of entrepreneurs
seeking funding from angels are successful”).
93 See Bradford, supra note 64, at 101.
94 See id. Reliance on personal funds or family and friends effectively precludes a significant portion of
the U.S. population without such resources from pursuing a startup idea. See Deborah L. Cohen, Fund for All:
‘Crowdfunding’ Supporters Look to Congress to Lighten Regulatory Load, 98 A.B.A. J. 11 (2012). Similarly,
SEC regulatory requirements also “favor those with connections to high-net-worth individuals, wealthy friends
and family members.” Id.
95 Friends and family financing frequently violates Section 5’s registration requirements and is often
discovered only when a company is preparing for its initial public offering. See Sara Hanks, JOBS Act
Crowdfunding Provisions Await Clarification by SEC, in 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1710, 1710 (Sept. 17,
2012).
96 Burkett, supra note 42, at 82.
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hundred thousand dollars.97 These costs make registration impractical for
startups seeking relatively small amounts of capital, especially since startups
would have to bear these costs before any capital is raised.98
Additionally, none of the traditional securities registration exemptions fit
the equity crowdfunding model. For example, while Regulation A exempts
offerings of less than $5 million in a twelve-month period,99 it requires filing
an offering statement with the SEC and delivering a final offering circular to
purchasers.100 For most startups, these filing costs alone are prohibitive.101 But
Regulation A also fails to preempt state registration requirements—meaning
issuers have to comply with varying state registration or exemption
requirements in each state where a security is sold.102 In a crowdfunding
model, securities would likely be sold in dozens of states and to hundreds of
people, which effectively precludes the use of Regulation A.103
Additional exemptions under Regulation D—Rules 504 and 505—extend
to offerings of no more than $1 million and $5 million, respectively, in a
twelve-month period.104 Regulation D Rule 506—a “safe harbor” for the
private offering exemption of Section 4(2)—does not limit the aggregate
offering size.105 Prior to the passage of the JOBS Act, Regulation D prohibited
general solicitation and advertising under Rules 505 and 506, and Regulation
D still only permits solicitation and advertising that complies with applicable
state laws for Rule 504.106 Additionally, Rules 505 and 506 do not permit
selling to more than thirty-five non-accredited investors,107 and Rule 504 does
not preempt state registration requirements, thus posing the same problem as

97

See Bradford, supra note 64, at 42; Burkett, supra note 42, at 82.
See Bradford, supra note 64, at 42.
99 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2012).
100 Id. § 230.251(d).
101 See Bradford, supra note 64, at 48. Regulation A offerings typically cost upwards of $40,000. See id.
102 See Burkett, supra note 42, at 88.
103 See id.
104 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504(b)(2), 505(b)(2)(i) (2012).
105 See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 65, at 917–18.
106 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(c), 505(b)(1), 506(b)(1), 504(b)(1) (2012). Following passage of the JOBS Act,
the SEC promulgated Rule 506(c), which permits an issuer the option to engage in general solicitation and
advertising under Rule 506 as long as all purchasers of the securities are accredited investors and the issuer
“take[s] reasonable steps” to verify that purchasers of the securities are accredited investors. See Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)
(2013).
107 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), 506(b)(2)(i).
98
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Regulation A.108 These limitations effectively nullify the value of these
exemptions for typical crowdfunded ventures.109
Given the surge in popularity of crowdfunding, its potential to address the
funding gap, and the inapplicability of current registration exemptions, it
became apparent that a new crowdfunding-specific registration exemption was
needed.
C. The Legislative History of the Crowdfund Act
If both sides of the congressional aisle agree upon anything, it is that small
businesses are the backbone of the American economy.110 From the late Steve
Jobs to Mark Zuckerberg, the entrepreneur behind the high-growth startup is
America’s darling.111 During the recession of 2007–2009, when larger
corporations shed jobs and froze hiring, politicians and the public looked to
small businesses and startups as job creators and engines of economic
growth.112 However, without capital to grow, entrepreneurs cannot keep
themselves employed, much less create jobs for others.113 Perhaps it should not
have been a surprise, then, that crowdfunding sailed through the legislative
process, even in the most polarized Congress since Reconstruction.114
108

See id. § 230.504(b)(1).
See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 65, at 920. But see generally Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding:
The Real and the Illusory Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (arguing that “accredited
crowdfunding” under the new Rule 506(c) will likely dominate retail equity crowdfunding).
110 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President After Roundtable with Local Business Leaders
in Seattle, Washington (Aug. 17, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2010/08/17/remarks-president-after-roundtable-with-local-business-leaders-seattle-w)
(“America’s
small
businesses are the backbone of our economy . . . .”); Restoring the American Dream: Economy & Jobs,
GOP.COM, http://www.gop.com/2012-republican-platform_restoring/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2013) (“America’s
small businesses are the backbone of the U.S. economy . . . .”).
111 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill Signing (Apr. 5, 2012)
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/remarks-president-jobs-actbill-signing) (stating “maybe . . . one of the folks in the audience here today will be the next Bill Gates or
Steve Jobs or Mark Zuckerberg”).
112 See Gene B. Sperling & Karen G Mills, Introduction to NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, THE SMALL BUSINESS
AGENDA: GROWING AMERICA’S SMALL BUSINESSES TO WIN THE FUTURE (2011) (“With regards to job
creation, however, we know that America’s small businesses pack the biggest punch, creating two out of every
three new jobs in the U.S. each year.”).
113 See Obama, supra note 111. For example, angel investments in early-stage companies generated
370,000 new jobs in 2010. Jeffrey Sohl, The Angel Investor Market in 2010: A Market on the Rebound, CTR.
FOR VENTURE RESEARCH, Apr. 12, 2011, available at http://paulcollege.unh.edu/sites/default/files/2010_
analysis_report.pdf.
114 See Frank James, Political Scientist: Republicans Most Conservative They’ve Been in 100 Years, NPR
(Apr. 13, 2012, 2:24 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/04/10/150349438/gops-rightward-shifthigher-polarization-fills-political-scientist-with-dread.
109
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As early as July 2010, the SEC received and largely ignored one of the first
of a number of petitions to create a crowdfunding exemption.115 Then, in
September 2011, President Obama endorsed crowdfunding in his proposed
American Jobs Act as a way to stimulate the sluggish economy.116 Within two
months, on November 3, 2011, crowdfunding House Bill 2930, sponsored by
Representative Patrick McHenry, passed the House 407–17.117 The McHenry
bill, which was very simple and “broadly consistent with the President’s
proposal,”118 called for a crowdfunding exemption allowing firms to raise up to
$1 million with individual investments capped at the lesser of $10,000 or 10%
of an investor’s annual income.119
While McHenry’s bill swept through the House, Senator Scott Brown
proposed a different crowdfunding bill, Senate Bill 1791, the Democratizing
Access to Capital Act of 2011.120 Brown’s bill limited investments to $1,000
per investor and required more substantial disclosures by the issuer.121
One month later, on December 8, 2011, Senator Jeff Merkley sponsored yet
another crowdfunding bill, Senate Bill 1970.122 Merkley’s bill included several
new provisions and restrictions, a number of which survived in the final
Crowdfund Act. First, Merkley proposed capping annual investment at 1% of
the investor’s annual income for investors earning greater than $50,000 and
less than $100,000 annually and 2% of the investor’s annual income for
investors earning greater than $100,000 annually.123 Merkley’s bill also
introduced the “funding portal” intermediary requirement, imposed the target
115

See Burkett, supra note 42, at 93, 102–03, 105 (discussing the petition and the unlikeliness of SEC

action).
116 See Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: The American Jobs Act (Sept.
8, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/08/fact-sheet-american-jobs-act;
Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 12.
117 See Press Release, Congressman Patrick McHenry, House Passes McHenry Crowdfunding Bill (Nov.
3, 2011), available at http://mchenry.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=267628.
118 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION
POLICY: H.R. 2930—ENTREPRENEUR ACCESS TO CAPITAL ACT, (Nov. 2, 2011), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saphr2930r_20111102.pdf.
119 H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). Firms could raise up to $2 million if they provided audited
financial statements to potential investors. Id.
120 S. 1791, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011).
121 See id. § 2.
122 S. 1970, 112th Cong. (2011). It is interesting to note that two of Merkley’s top three contributors by
industry were “lawyers/law firms” and “securities and investment.” Top Industries: Senator Jeff Merkley
2007–2012, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/industries.php?type=C&cid=N000293
03&newMem=N&cycle=2012 (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
123 S. 1970, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). The amount was capped at $500 if the investor earned $50,000 or
less. See id.
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offering provision, and required even more substantial issuer disclosures to
investors and the SEC than either McHenry or Brown’s bill.124 Most
importantly, at least for the purposes of this Comment, Merkley included a
new civil liability provision.125 This provision created a direct, private right of
action against the
issuer and any person who is a director or officer (or any person
occupying a similar status or performing a similar function) or
partner in the issuer . . . for any untrue statement of a material fact
or omission to state a material fact required to be stated in
connection with any offering.126
The Senate did not act on either bill until after the House passed the JOBS
Act, which essentially incorporated wholesale McHenry’s crowdfunding bill,
on March 8, 2012.127 Five days later Senators Merkley and Brown introduced a
hastily written and poorly drafted128 compromise crowdfunding bill, Senate
Bill 2190.129 The compromise bill retained most of Merkley’s requirements,
although it raised the investor cap to be more in line with the McHenry bill.130
Moreover, it retained the direct liability provision from Merkley’s bill,
although it added an affirmative due diligence defense for issuers—also known
as a reasonable care defense—that resembles the due diligence defense in

124

See id. § 2(b); supra notes 116, 118 and accompanying text. Shortly after the introduction of Senate
Bill 1970, attorney and blogger William Carleton wrote that the bill “takes paternalism to new (and wholly
impractical) magnifications of micro-management.” William Carleton, Third #Crowdfunding Bill Is No
Charm, COUNSELOR@LAW (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.wac6.com/wac6/2011/12/senator-merkleyintroduces-alternative-crowdfunding-bill.html.
125 S. 1970 § 2(b).
126 Id.
127 See Jonathan Weisman, With November in Mind, House Passes a Jobs Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2012,
at A16. The JOBS Act as a whole loosened a number of securities regulations, including lifting the ban on
general solicitation and advertising for offers made pursuant to Rule 506 of Regulation D, lessening
accounting requirements on “emerging growth companies,” creating a new offering exemption for amounts up
to $50 million per twelve-month period modeled off Regulation A, and upping the shareholder and asset
amount cap for mandatory registration. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§102,
201, 401, 501, 601, 126 Stat. 306, 309–10, 313, 323–27 (2012). For more information on the JOBS Act, see
generally Elizabeth M. Dunshee & David M. Lynn, The JOBS Act: Easing Exempt Offering Restrictions, BUS.
L. TODAY (May 2012), http://dialogueonfreedom.org/buslaw/blt/content/2012/05/article-02-dunshee.pdf.
128 See Bradford, supra note 18, at 198 (describing the poorly drafted crowdfunding exemption, which
incorporates Senate Bill 2190). Professor Bradford notes that there are a number of inconsistencies and several
ambiguities in the Crowdfund Act and even one glaring drafting error that cross-references the wrong section.
See id. at 215–16.
129 S. 2190, 112th Cong. (2012).
130 See id. § 2(a); supra notes 117–19, 122–26 and accompanying text.
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Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act.131 In the name of protecting investors
from fraud, Senators Merkley, Brown, and Bennet offered this compromise
crowdfunding bill as an amendment to the JOBS Act, replacing McHenry’s
less-burdensome crowdfunding proposal.132
In a rush of bipartisan momentum, exacerbated by the need to pass
substantive legislation during an election year, the Senate voted in favor of the
amendment and the JOBS Act on March 22, and the House followed suit on
March 27, 2012.133 With great fanfare, President Obama signed the JOBS Act
into law on April 5, 2012.134 The Crowdfund Act instructed the SEC to
promulgate securities regulations to govern equity crowdfunding within 270
days after the legislation’s signing.135 As of this writing, the SEC has missed
its 270-day deadline, and industry observers speculate that rules may not be
finalized until early 2014.136 Given the expected delay in legalizing equity
crowdfunding and the Crowdfund Act’s high transaction costs, as discussed in
Part II, the political self-congratulations for passing the Crowdfund Act were
premature.
II. THE HIGH TRANSACTION COSTS OF CROWDFUNDING
Securities regulation involves a requisite balancing act between mandating
sufficient disclosures to protect investors from fraud yet refraining from
creating regulations so burdensome on companies that businesses cannot
effectively raise capital in the markets.137 Securities regulation in the United
States is grounded in a disclosure-based system—the idea that, as Justice
Brandeis stated, “[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light
the most efficient policeman.”138 Thus, the SEC does not examine the merits of
public offerings; rather, it attempts to enforce accurate, sufficient disclosures to

131 See S. 2190 § 2(c)(2) (“An issuer shall be liable . . . if the issuer . . . does not sustain the burden of
proof that such issuer did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of [a
requisite] untruth or omission.”); supra note 24.
132 See Seung Min Kim, Senate Passes JOBS Act, with Tweak, POLITICO (Mar. 22, 2012, 1:29 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/74363.html. Senator Merkley stated that the crowdfunding portion
of the JOBS Act in the House bill was “simply a pathway to predatory scams.” Id.
133 See Jonathan Weisman, Final Approval by House Sends Jobs Bill to President for Signature, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2012, at A12.
134 See Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 12.
135 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(c), 126 Stat. 306, 320 (2012).
136 See Amy Cortese, The Crowd Is Anxious, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013, at BU1.
137 Cf. Hazen, supra note 20, at 1765.
138 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (1933).

MASHBURN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

9/24/2013 12:10 PM

THE ANTI–CROWD PLEASER

147

allow investors to determine the merits of an investment for themselves.139
There is almost no question that—given the volatility of startups, the difficulty
of determining the pre-money valuation of a startup, crowdfunding’s targeting
of retail investors, and the risk of fraud—the Crowdfund Act needed robust
disclosure requirements.140 The difficulty lies in mandating sufficient
disclosure to remedy information asymmetry between issuer and investor,
while not creating an exemption that is too burdensome for issuers to use in
practice. At first glance, the Crowdfund Act appears to perform an acceptable
job of balancing investor protection and manageable disclosure
requirements.141 However, as this Comment shows, the Crowdfund Act’s
hidden costs will drive up transaction costs for all issuers and may entirely
deter sophisticated issuers from relying on crowdfunding.
Although the mechanics of the Crowdfund Act are complicated, an entire
industry is springing up to guide issuers through the process.142 First, an issuer
must file certain basic information with the SEC and make the same
information available to potential investors through the funding portal143: the
issuer’s name, legal status, physical address, and website; the names of the
issuer’s directors, officers, and shareholders owning more than 20% of the
company; and the issuer’s business plan and the intended use of the
proceeds.144 The issuer must also provide information that will require the
assistance of attorneys, including the terms of the securities being offered; a
description of how the securities offered are valued; and the specific risks
involved with ownership, additional issuance of shares, and a sale of the issuer
or of the issuer’s assets.145 Appropriately disclosing the specific risks involved
139

See Hazen, supra note 20, at 1741.
See id. at 1769; Johnson, supra note 24.
141 See Karina Sigar, Comment, Fret No More: Inapplicability of Crowdfunding Concerns in the Internet
Age and the Jobs Act’s Safeguards, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 473, 489–502 (2012) (arguing that the wisdom of the
tech-savvy market and the JOBS Act’s safeguards render worries over investor protection unfounded).
142 See Crowdfunding 101, STARTUP EXEMPTION, http://www.startupexemption.com/crowdfunding-101#
axzz2FRojAL7A (last visited Aug. 13, 2013); see infra note 272 and accompanying text.
143 The JOBS Act also imposes a number of requirements on funding portals, including registering with
the SEC and with a self-regulatory organization; providing investors with education materials; ensuring that
investors review the education materials and affirm that they understand the risk of investment; obtaining
background checks on directors, officers, and shareholders owning more than 20% of the issuer’s outstanding
equity; releasing funds only when the target amount is met; and preventing investors from exceeding
investment limits. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306, 316
(2012).
144 See id. at 317.
145 See id. at 317–18. The SEC also has the broad power to require additional information by rule “for the
protection of investors and in the public interest,” which may generate additional transaction costs once the
SEC promulgates its rules. See id.
140
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in ownership to avoid liability will likely be a substantial task that requires an
attorney, especially if the SEC adopts a disclosure format resembling the Form
1-A offering statement used in Regulation A offerings.146 While Regulation A–
style disclosure requirements may be sensible, they will drive up the cost of
using crowdfunding.147 Moreover, attorneys will also need to review and
potentially amend existing corporate provisions, such as voting rights, board
composition, restrictions on share transfers, and company right of first refusal,
that might conflict with a crowdfunded offering, all of which further increases
the costs of crowdfunding.148
An even greater concern of Crowdfund Act critics is the Act’s financial
disclosure requirements. Issuers seeking to raise $100,000 or less must provide
company income tax returns for the previously completed year and financial
statements of the issuer certified accurate by the principal executive officer.149
Issuers seeking to raise between $100,000 and $500,000 must provide financial
statements reviewed by a public accountant, and issuers raising between
$500,000 and $1 million must provide audited financial statements.150 These
financial disclosure requirements impose larger burdens than certain other
registration exemptions, such as Regulation D151 or Regulation A.152 The cost
of audited statements is likely to eat up a “significant percentage” of funds
raised,153 especially for startups, which rarely undertake the auditing process
this early in the business’s lifecycle.154

146

See Taku, supra note 50.
See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 65, at 921 & n.216 (“Although mini-registration under
Regulation A costs less than a registered offering, the expense of a Regulation A offering will often still be
more than the amount of capital that the crowdfunding venture seeks to raise.”).
148 See Vincent Ryan, The Burdens of Crowdfunding, CFO (May 9, 2012), http://www.cfo.com/article.
cfm/14638132/1 (writing that the “regulatory hurdles” in the JOBS Act “may be too complex and onerous—
and not very cost-effective” for many startups); Taku, supra note 50 (noting that “many companies may be
unable to prepare disclosure documents in compliance with the crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act”
based on the transaction costs).
149 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302(b).
150 See id. § 302(a)–(b).
151 See Cohn, supra note 21, at 1442. For example, Professor Cohn notes that CEO-certified financial
statements are not required for other federal or state registration exemptions and that Rule 504 of Regulation D
does not require financial statements for offerings up to $1 million. See id.
152 Part F/S of Regulation A Form 1-A does not require audited financial statements unless the issuer
already has them prepared, for up to $5 million. 3A HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF,
SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 6:43 (2d ed. 2013); see 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2012).
153 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, The Troubles with the New Crowdfunding Law?, JD SUPRA L. NEWS
(May 22, 2012), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-troubles-with-the-new-crowdfunding-l-71994.
154 See Cohn, supra note 21, at 1442 (noting that “[i]t is difficult to understand how these major practical
concerns could have been ignored or so readily dismissed”); Mandelbaum, supra note 15.
147
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Based on these disclosure requirements, issuers will have to compensate at
least three outside parties: the attorneys preparing the offering materials, the
accountants creating the financial statements, and the funding portal hosting
the offering. The funding portal fee—likely structured as a percentage of the
funds raised155—will probably be considerable based on all the requirements
levied on funding portals, including educating and screening investors,
conducting background checks, monitoring investor caps, registering with the
SEC and a self-regulatory organization, and potentially confronting Section
4A(c) liability.156 Compensating all of these outside parties is likely to add up
to a substantial sum relative to the amount of money being raised.157 However,
the more significant costs for issuers are hidden—the administrative cost of
managing shareholders, the deterrent effect on later rounds of investment, and
the potential liability costs down the road.
First, there is the administrative cost associated with managing numerous
shareholder investments and relationships.158 This cost may include new
shareholders asking questions of the business and seeking to inspect corporate
books and records159 and the cost of bookkeeping investments.160 Long-term
compliance with the Crowdfund Act will require issuers to retain the services
155 Crowdcube, an equity crowdfunding platform in the United Kingdom, charges a 5% fee on the total
funds collected as well as a legal fee. See Adrianne Jeffries, The U.K. Already Has Equity-Based
Crowdfunding, and This Startup Just Set a Record, BETA BEAT (June 8, 2012, 8:52 AM), http://betabeat.com/
2012/06/the-u-k-already-has-equity-based-crowdfunding-and-this-startup-just-set-a-record/.
156 See Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, supra note 153 (“These [registered broker dealers or funding portals]
are subject to numerous requirements, and their compliance with those requirements will make the process
much more difficult and costly for [startups].”); supra note 143. For more on the burdens placed on funding
portals, see generally Thomas V. Powers, SEC Regulation of Crowdfunding Intermediaries Under Title III of
the JOBS Act, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., October 2012, at 1. Section 4A(c)’s definition of
“issuer” appears to extend liability for misrepresentations and omissions made by the issuer to the hosting
funding portal as well. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306,
319 (2012) (“As used in this subsection, the term ‘issuer’ includes . . . any person who offers or sells the
security in [a crowdfunded] offering.”). This appears to mean that the funding portal is liable for statements
that it makes about the offering as well as statements that the issuer makes about the offering. See Hanks,
supra note 95. If the issuer ends up judgment-proof from a lack of funds, then disgruntled investors may go
after the funding portals, the cost of which will ultimately be passed along to later issuers via higher hosting
fees.
157 See Tretter, supra note 20, at 2.
158 See Louis A. Bevilacqua et al., JOBS Act Targets Smaller Business Capital Raising, PILLSBURY L.
(Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/publications/jobs-act-targets-smaller-business-capital-raising.
John Alexander, founder and chair of the Twin Cities Angels, writes that “[n]on-accredited investors can be a
nightmare for a CEO.” John Alexander, The Obama JOBS Act and Crowdfunding: Bright Promises, Likely
Failure, BRING ME THE NEWS (May 8, 2012), http://www.bringmethenews.com/2012/05/08/the-obama-jobsact-and-crowdfunding-bright-promises-likely-failure/.
159 See Taku, supra note 50, at 4.
160 See Sigar, supra note 141, at 482.
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of accountants and attorneys because reports on the results of operations and
the issuer’s financial statements must be filed “not less than annually” with the
SEC and provided to investors.161 A second hidden cost resides in the fact that
many, if not most, venture capital firms and angel investor groups will be
reluctant to invest in companies that previously utilized crowdfunding162 since
these groups worry about investing in deals with numerous small and
unsophisticated shareholders who could create liability issues down the
road.163 Venture capital firms will also want to avoid the additional hassles that
arise from having numerous shareholders, such as needing to seek shareholder
approval before a new round of funding or other corporate actions that may
trigger voting requirements.164 The deterrence of venture capital funding will
be especially problematic for potentially high-growth issuers in life sciences,
technology, and manufacturing, that typically expect successive rounds of
funding from angel investors or venture capital firms.165 However, the third
and most significant hidden cost is the unexpected liability risk posed by
Section 4A(c)’s broad sweep as discussed in Part III.

161

See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302(b).
See John Tozzi, Alone in a Crowd: How Crowdfunding Could Strand Startups, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-03-06/alone-in-a-crowd-howcrowdfunding-could-strand-startups; Telephone Interview with Devon Wijesinghe, Former President, Atlanta
Technology Angels (Oct. 2, 2012) (explaining that angel investors prefer a clean capitalization table).
163 See Susan Schreter, Crowdfunding—Boom or Bust for Entrepreneurs?, FOX BUSINESS (May 16,
2012), http://smallbusiness.foxbusiness.com/finance-accounting/2012/05/16/crowdfunding-boom-or-bust-forentrepreneurs/#ixzz2H23sD74t; Telephone Interview with Bradley M. Burman, Associate Attorney, Nelson
Mullins Riley & Scarborough (Sept. 28, 2012) (opining that venture capitalists are unlikely to invest in a
company that engages in crowdfunding because the numerous investors who each own small shares in that
company also have the right to sue it).
164 See Tozzi, supra note 162; Telephone Interview with Bradley M. Burman, supra note 163 (opining
that venture capitalists are unlikely to invest in a company that engages in crowdfunding because they will
need to obtain the approval of numerous investors “every time they want to get something done”).
165 See Todd Hixon, Is Crowdfunding a Boon, or a Disaster?, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2012, 9:44 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/toddhixon/2012/04/04/is-crowdfunding-a-boon-or-a-disaster/; Tozzi, supra note 162. If,
on the other hand, venture capitalists are not deterred from investing in crowdfunded ventures, then there is a
significant risk that crowdfunding shareholders’ stakes may be diluted if they do not have proper upside
protection. For more information on this problem and several excellent solutions, see Wroldsen, supra note 11,
at 611–22.
162
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III. LIABILITY PROVISION 4A(C)—DRACONIAN FOR ISSUERS AND AN
INEFFECTIVE REMEDY FOR INVESTORS
Because of the SEC’s limited resources, a great deal of policing fraud is
accomplished through private actions brought by investors,166 which helps
protect both investors and the market’s integrity.167 Given the expected high
number of crowdfunding investments and their small size, such investments
will likely escape close regulatory oversight.168 Crowdfunding presents a
dynamic unseen in securities regulations and, thus, requires a rethinking of
how civil liability provisions can best protect investors and the functioning of
the market.
A. Current Section 12(a)(2) Elements and Application
Since Section 4A(c) of the Crowdfund Act borrows directly from the
language of Securities Act Section 12(a)(2),169 any prediction regarding the
future application of Section 4A(c) must start with an examination of Section
12(a)(2). Section 12(a)(2) provides investors with a right of action against
issuers for materially misleading statements or omissions contained in an oral
communication or a prospectus.170 The prima facie elements for a plaintiff’s
cause of action under Section 12(a)(2) include (1) an offer or sale of a security
(2) by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or of the mails (3) by means of a prospectus or oral
communication (4) that includes an untrue statement of material fact or omits
to state a material fact necessary to make the statements, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.171 While
166 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1536 (2006); Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Litigation
Discovery and Corporate Governance: The Missing Story About the “Genius of American Corporate Law,”
63 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming spring 2014) (manuscript at 49), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239322
(“Regulators in the United States do not have the resources to provide the existing level of verification and
enforcement of securities disclosure without the substantial resources dedicated to the process by private
parties.”).
167 Thomas A. Martin, The JOBS Act of 2012: Balancing Fundamental Securities Law Principles with the
Demands of the Crowd 6–7 (Apr. 12, 2012) (unpublished comment), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2040953.
168 See Letter from William Francis Galvin to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 26, at 2 (writing that
crowdfunding “offerings will fly under the radars of many regulators”).
169 Tretter, supra note 20.
170 See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012).
171 Id. The seminal Supreme Court case Pinter v. Dahl clarified that liability under 12(a)(2) extends only
to “statutory sellers,” meaning a seller that passed title to the buyer for value or successfully solicited the
purchase of a security. See 486 U.S. 622, 642, 647 (1988).
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Section 11’s elements are similar,172 three key differences exist that show
Section 4A(c) is more closely patterned off Section 12(a)(2);173 thus, this
Comment primarily confines its discussion to Section 12(a)(2).
Section 12(a)(2)’s prima facie elements are relatively easy to prove,
especially compared to the elements of Rule 10b-5174—the broadest and most
important liability provision in securities law175—for three reasons. First, the
level of culpability required by Section 12(a)(2) is mere negligence, not
scienter as required in Rule 10b-5.176 Second, the plaintiff does not have to
prove reliance as required under Rule 10b-5—even if the plaintiff never read
or heard the untruth, the issuer could still be held liable under 12(a)(2).177
Finally, the plaintiff does not need to prove loss causation as required under
Rule 10b-5—the share price may have dropped for any reason and the issuer
may still be liable if a false statement was made.178 However, the plaintiff does
have the burden of proving that he or she did not know of the misstatement or
omission at the time the plaintiff purchased the security.179 Although liability
under Section 12(a)(2) is “more readily triggered” than under Rule 10b-5, it is
far narrower in scope180 because the false statement or omission must have
172 See In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Claims under
sections 11 and 12(a)(2) are . . . Securities Act siblings with roughly parallel elements . . . .”). Section 11
provides investors with a right of action against issuers for materially misleading statements or omissions
contained in the registration statement. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11.
173 First, Section 11 does not apply to oral statements, whereas Sections 12(a)(2) and 4A(c) both
encompass oral statements. See 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 7:6 (2013); see also infra note 188 and accompanying text. Second, Section 11 only permits recovery based
on the difference between the amount paid for the security and the value of the security at the time of suit,
whereas Sections 12(a)(2) and 4A(c) both allow for rescission or damages. See Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing
Without a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429, 440 (2000); see
also infra note 211 and accompanying text. Third, the issuer is strictly liable under Section 11 whereas
Sections 12(a)(2) and 4A(c) both provide the same “reasonable care” affirmative defense to the issuer. See
HAZEN, supra, § 7:4; see also infra note 205 and accompanying text.
174 To state a claim under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must show the following six elements: (1) the defendant
made a materially false statement or omission (2) with scienter (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security (4) upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied (5) that caused the plaintiff to suffer economic loss, and
(6) there exists a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss. See Tad E. Thompson,
Recent Development, Messin’ with Texas: How the Fifth Circuit’s Decision in Oscar Private Equity
Misinterprets the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1086, 1087–88 (2008).
175 See Robert A. Prentice, The Future of Corporate Disclosure: The Internet, Securities Fraud, and Rule
10b-5, 47 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (1998).
176 See In re Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 367–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); 1 STUART R.
COHN, SECURITIES COUNSELING FOR SMALL AND EMERGING COMPANIES § 19:4 (2012).
177 See Currie v. Cayman Res. Corp., 835 F.2d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 1988).
178 See In re Wachovia, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
179 See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012).
180 See In re Wachovia, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 368.
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occurred in a written prospectus or oral communication that relates to the
prospectus in a public offering.181
In the seminal and highly controversial 5–4 opinion in Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., the Supreme Court essentially redefined the meaning of “prospectus” and
limited the application of 12(a)(2) to public offerings of securities.182
Following Gustafson, this limitation meant that investors purchasing shares in
a private offering, such as a Rule 144A or Rule 506 of Regulation D
offering,183 no longer had a private right of action for negligent
misrepresentations or omissions.184 Prior to Gustafson, the courts had
overwhelmingly held that Section 12(a)(2) applied to all securities offerings,
including secondary or private sales,185 and that the definition of “prospectus”
as used in Section 12(a)(2) included any “‘communication, written or by radio
or television.’”186 The majority in Gustafson stated that such a broad
interpretation of “prospectus” would “create[] vast additional liabilities” since
it “gives rise to an action for rescission, without proof of fraud by the seller or
reliance by the purchaser.”187 Yet, in Section 4A(c) of the Crowdfund Act, this
181

See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 567–68, 584 (1995).
See id. at 569. The Court repeatedly emphasized that for liability to attach under 12(a)(2), the material
misstatement or omission must have been made “by means of a prospectus or an oral communication.” See id.
at 567 (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on the use of “prospectus” in Section 10 of the Securities Act,
the Court held that “the term [prospectus] is confined to a document that, absent an overriding exemption,
must include the ‘information contained in the registration statement.’” Id. at 569.
183 However, Section 12(a)(2) specifically applies to the new “small” offering exemption created by the
JOBS Act, referred to as Regulation A+, which permits exempt offerings up to $50 million. See Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401(a), 126 Stat. 306, 324 (2012); Bevilacqua et al., supra note
158.
184 See Natasha S. Guinan, Note, Nearly a Decade Later: Revisiting Gustafson and the Status of Section
12(A)(2) Liability in the Courts—Creative Judicial Developments and a Proposal for Reform, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1053, 1075 (2004); Bevilacqua et al., supra note 158.
185 See COHN, supra note 176.
186 Cf. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 585–87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
187 See id. at 572, 574 (majority opinion). The Court reasoned:
182

It is not plausible to infer that Congress created this extensive liability for every casual
communication between buyer and seller . . . . It is often difficult, if not altogether impractical,
for those engaged in casual communications not to omit some fact that . . . could give rise to an
action for rescission, with no evidence of fraud on the part of the seller or reliance on the part of
the buyer.
Id. at 578. The dissent shared the majority’s opinion that “extending § 12(2) to secondary and private
transactions might result in an unwanted increase in securities litigation,” although the dissent believed the
Court “must rely upon other branches of government to limit the 1933 Act.” Id. at 594–95 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Academics have criticized Gustafson as being policy-based and “blatantly results-driven.” See,
e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 BUS. LAW. 1231,
1231–32 (1994–1995).
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is exactly what Congress did when it replaced “by means of a prospectus” with
“by any means of any written or oral communication,” thus broadening the
scope of liability for crowdfunded offerings by startups far beyond the scope of
Section 12(a)(2) liability for companies issuing public offerings.188
Before Gustafson, a “substantial upswing” in claims brought under Section
12(a)(2) had occurred.189 After Gustafson excluded purchasers in private
offerings from making a claim under Section 12(a)(2), the usefulness of
Section 12(a)(2)—and the number of cases brought under it—decreased.190
Adding insult to injury, courts also utilized Gustafson to impose even stricter
“tracing” requirements on shareholders bringing a 12(a)(2) claim.191 This
required shareholders to plead and prove that they bought their shares either
“in” or “pursuant to” the public offering in which the prospectus containing the
material misstatement was issued.192 This standing requirement effectively
limits the class of people who can bring suit under Section 12(a)(2) to
purchasers of shares directly connected to the faulty prospectus.193 As a result
of this limitation, the vast majority of claims brought under Section 12(a)(2) do
not survive motions to dismiss and class certification is denied for want of
traceability.194 Given these tight restrictions, experienced securities fraud class
action lawyers generally assert Rule 10b-5 claims instead.195 Section 12(a)(2)
claims are more likely to be secondary or pro forma if included at all.196
The above-mentioned restrictions have severely limited “the deterrent and
remedial purposes” of Section 12(a)(2) in civil litigation.197 However, none of
these restrictions is likely to be present in Section 4A(c) in a crowdfunded
188 See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012); Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306, 315, 319 (2012).
189 See Bainbridge, supra note 187, at 1234.
190 See Sale, supra note 173, at 431–32; Guinan, supra note 184, at 1069 (“[T]he Gustafson decision was,
arguably, a policy-based result, the express aim of which was to decrease securities litigation by facilitating
fewer lawsuits.”).
191 See Sale, supra note 173, at 432.
192 See id. at 441.
193 See id. at 441–42. For example, Professor Sale notes that if the shareholders purchased previously
issued common stock and not new common stock issued under the faulty prospectus, the shareholders will not
have a cause of action. Id. at 442.
194 See id. at 482–83.
195 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, GOING PUBLIC HANDBOOK § 10:38 (2012).
196 Id.
197 See Sale, supra note 173, at 431. Professor Sale elaborates—“Indeed, the effect of the tracing
requirement and Gustafson on the accessibility of section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims to shareholders is dramatic.
The Second Circuit’s mistaken finding that the tracing requirement would both prevent overinclusiveness and
fulfill the statute’s purpose has resulted in scores of dismissed cases.” Id. at 462.
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offering. Because Congress replaced “prospectus” with “any written or oral
communication,” the reach of Section 4A(c) will certainly cover all disclosure
statements filed with the SEC and provided to investors, and it will likely
cover all additional statements related to the offering or selling of the
securities.198 Minimal traceability issues will exist because investors must hold
purchased securities for a minimum of one year under the Crowdfund Act.199
The absence of these hurdles will make class certification far easier under
Section 4A(c) than under Section 12(a)(2). Given Section 4A(c)’s broad sweep
and minimal elements, plaintiffs’ attorneys will now likely prefer to bring a
claim under Section 4A(c) rather than under Rule 10b-5.200 Temporarily
leaving aside the financial incentive to bring the class action, Section 4A(c) is
far more likely to provide an express cause of action for plaintiffs than Section
12(a)(2) ever supplied. However, Section 4A(c)’s cause of action is likely too
express to fit the new crowdfunding environment. Startups issuing a
crowdfunding offering will confront substantial liability exposure based on a
number of factors unique to startups and crowdfunding that will increase the
likelihood of an inadvertent material misstatement or omission occurring in a
crowdfunded offering as discussed in the following section.
B. Crowdfunding’s New Liability Dynamic
Section 4A(c) of the Crowdfund Act imposes liability on any issuer,
including personal liability on all officers and directors, for any materially201
false or misleading statements or omissions made by “any means of any
written or oral communication, in the offering or sale of a security in a
transaction exempted by the provisions of Section 4(6).”202 Section 4A(c), like
Section 12(a)(2), presents three bases for liability: (1) a misrepresentation of
factual information, (2) an omission of factual information in the face of an
affirmative duty to disclose, or (3) an omission of factual information that is
198

See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306, 315, 319 (2012).
However, purchasers may transfer these securities (1) to the issuer, (2) to an accredited investor, (3) as part of
a registered offering, or (4) to a family member prior to the one-year mark. Id.
200 See Sale, supra note 173, at 469 (noting that “Securities Act claims [Sections 11 and 12] should be
easier to prove than their Securities Exchange Act counterpart [Section 10b]”). Given the discarding of the
restrictions in Section 4A(c) detailed above, it follows that attorneys will now actually find a Section 4A(c)
claim easier to prove than a Rule 10b-5 claim.
201 Presumably, “materiality” will continue to mean a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would consider the misstatement or omission significant in deciding whether to invest. See Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988).
202 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302(b).
199
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necessary to prevent previous disclosures from being misleading.203 The
liability provision limits plaintiffs to purchasers in a crowdfunding transaction
who do not know of the “untruth or omission.”204 Section 4A(c), like Section
12(a)(2), also provides two affirmative defenses for issuers. First, the issuer
can attempt to prove that it “did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of such untruth or omission.”205 This defense—
known as the “reasonable care” or “due diligence” defense—places a heavy
burden on the issuer, because it is charged with constructive knowledge until it
can prove that it could not have learned of the material misstatement or
omission through the exercise of reasonable care.206 If the issuer or any of its
employees is negligent, then this defense will likely not preclude recovery.207
In addition, the issuer can avoid liability for part or all of the damages if it can
prove that the loss of value occurred because of something other than the
untrue statement.208 This is the opposite of the burden imposed in Rule 10b-5,
under which the plaintiff must prove loss causation,209 but is in line with the
negative loss causation defense under Section 12(a)(2).210
Section 4A(c)’s remedies also parallel those of Section 12(a)(2). If the
plaintiff tenders the security back to the issuer, the plaintiff may recover “the
consideration paid for such security,” plus interest on it.211 If the plaintiff “no
longer owns the security,” the plaintiff can sue for damages,212 although the
statute does not state how to calculate such damages.213 Plaintiffs often prefer
rescissionary damages, such as those available under Sections 12(a)(2) or
4A(c), rather than the actual damages available under Rule 10b-5, because

203 See id.; 17A J. WILLIAM HICKS, CIVIL LIABILITIES: ENFORCEMENT & LITIGATION UNDER THE 1933
ACT § 6:133 (2013).
204 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302(b).
205 See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012); Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act § 302(b).
206 See HICKS, supra note 203, § 6:165.
207 See COHN, supra note 176, § 19:4. Under Section 12(a)(2), the courts look at several factors in
evaluating the due diligence defense, “including level of participation in the transaction, access to source
material, skill in finding the truth, financial interest in completing the transaction, and level of trust in the
relationship between purchaser and seller.” Sale, supra note 173, at 439.
208 Bradford, supra note 18, at 210–11.
209 See Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule 10b-5 Causes of Action:
The Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 63 BUS. LAW. 163, 163–64 (2007).
210 Bradford, supra note 18, at 210–11.
211 Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012); Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
§ 302(b).
212 Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2); Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302(b).
213 Bradford, supra note 18, at 210.
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rescissionary damages often provide fuller compensation.214 As discussed
below, crowdfunding’s dynamic creates a greater risk of startup issuers making
material misstatements or omissions than issuers face in a typical public
offering. Thus, the Crowdfund Act’s adoption and broadening of Section
12(a)(2)—a liability provision that applies only to statements in a public
offering prospectus and is inapplicable to private offerings—simply does not
fit the crowdfunding context. At the same time, the relatively small amounts
invested by individuals and the high obstacles to class action certification
suggest that crowdfunding investors who suffer losses due to actual fraud may
have no access to a remedy.215
1. The Increased Risk of Material Misstatements or Omissions for Startups
in a Crowdfunding Offering
Several unique characteristics of startups and crowdfunding will
dramatically increase the likelihood of a material misstatement or omission in a
crowdfunded offering, resulting in greater liability exposure for crowdfunding
issuers. As discussed in Part III.A, Section 12(a)(2) applies only to companies
making a public offering, which means the company has reached a certain
stage of maturity in its lifecycle. Crowdfunding, on the other hand, is designed
for startups—businesses still in their infancy.216 Startups face multiple
disadvantages compared to more mature companies due to startups’ limited
human, informational, and financial resources; personal financial pressures;
and greater risk and complexity in decision-making.217 Crowdfunded startups
simply will not have the same resources to hire compliance experts and may
not even realize the necessity of doing so.218 In addition, crowdfunded startups
will confront six different issues—explored in detail in the rest of this
214

See Bainbridge, supra note 187, at 1233–34.
See infra Part III.B.2.
216 Technically, any company that satisfies the Crowdfund Act’s requirements can use crowdfunding.
However, Section 4A(f) disqualifies reporting companies, meaning any company that is required to “file
reports pursuant to section 13 or section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,” which effectively
limits the size of crowdfunding companies. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302(b).
217 See Jill Perry-Smith & Leslie H. Vincent, The Benefits and Liabilities of Multidisciplinary
Commercialization Teams: How Professional Composition and Social Networks Influence Team Processes, in
18 TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: GENERATING ECONOMIC RESULTS 35, 36 (Gary D. Libecap & Marie C.
Thursby eds., 2008).
218 See Bryan Sullivan & Stephen Ma, Crowdfunding: Potential Legal Disaster Waiting to Happen,
FORBES (Oct. 22, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericsavitz/2012/10/22/crowdfunding-potentiallegal-disaster-waiting-to-happen/ (noting that many of the businesses using crowdfunding “won’t have the
business experience or savvy to make even the minimum appropriate disclosures or hire an attorney to guide
them through disclosure drafting and execution”).
215
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section—that will raise the likelihood of liability attaching under Section
4A(c): (1) dramatically higher likelihood of business failure, (2) emerging
technology product development problems, (3) entrepreneurs’ psychological
predispositions to risk, (4) the broadening of Section 4A(c)’s applicability to
“any written or oral communication,”219 (5) crowdfunding’s unique pitching
strategy, and (6) a lack of thorough due diligence conducted by investors.
These six characteristics converge to create a dramatically heightened
likelihood that startups using crowdfunding will make material misstatements
or omissions.
First, startups are far more likely than reporting companies to fail and result
in investor losses, which raises the risk of investors bringing Section 4A(c)
lawsuits.220 When investors earn money, there are rarely lawsuits; it is when
investors lose money that “opportunistic plaintiff attorneys will look
aggressively for errors in company disclosures,”221 which raises the liability
exposure for crowdfunding startups.222 The maxim in venture investing is that
out of ten startups, three or four fail completely, three or four break even, and
one or two provide significant returns.223 A 2011 study by Professor Shikhar
Ghosh of Harvard Business School shows that the failure rate is actually even
higher: approximately three-quarters of venture-backed startups do not return
investors’ capital.224 Even more alarming when considering the likelihood of
material misstatements in financial statements and projections, Professor
Ghosh found that more than 95% of venture-backed startups fell short of either
their declared cash flow break-even date or specific revenue growth rate
projection.225 These figures do not bode well for crowdfunding startups

219

Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302(b) (emphasis added).
See Keith Paul Bishop, Crowdfunding—There Will Be Investor Losses, CAL. CORP. & SEC. L. (Apr. 4,
2012), http://calcorporatelaw.com/2012/04/crowdfunding-there-will-be-investor-losses/ (writing that he
“expect[s] that many of the issuers that use [crowdfunding] will be start-ups just trying to get off the ground”
and that “[m]any, if not most, of these companies will fail and there will be investor losses”).
221 Schreter, supra note 163.
222 Of course, this is not a new phenomenon or one unique to startups. However, the combination of
earlier stage companies and the volatility of the high-tech industry are likely to exacerbate the problem. For
example, Professor Alexander documented a large number of computer-related companies that went public in
1983 at an earlier stage in development than was normal at the time. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the
Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 507 (1991). When
these newly public firms failed to hit product deadlines and meet sales goals, their stock prices declined and
“[i]n due course class action suits were filed alleging securities violations in the offerings.” Id. at 508–09.
223 Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 Out of 4 Start-ups Fail, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2012, at
B1.
224 Id.
225 See id.
220
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because the startups Professor Ghosh tracked received funding from
established venture capital firms, which are highly selective, invest at a later
stage in the game,226 and generally conduct thorough due diligence before
investing.227 Yet even these closely vetted startups fail at an incredibly high
rate. These statistics should raise alarm bells for startups considering
crowdfunding and for investors as well because the issuers using crowdfunding
may at times be the same companies turned down by the more cautious angel
investors and venture capital firms.
Second, startups, especially high-tech startups, face serious issues with
developing emerging technology products on schedule.228 This challenge
makes crowdfunding issuers more vulnerable to liability actions brought by
unhappy investors when products fail to materialize as promised. Although the
press described the Pebble Watch as “a poster child for what can go wrong
with crowdfunded projects,”229 the Pebble Watch project’s failure to deliver its
product on schedule is not an anomaly. Professor Ethan Mollick of the
University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business tracked the results
of 381 successfully funded projects with “clearly identifiable outcomes” from
Kickstarter’s Design and Technology categories.230 Professor Mollick found
that “the majority of products were delayed, some substantially, and may,
ultimately, never be delivered.”231 Despite making “efforts to fulfill their
obligations to funders,” over 75% of Kickstarter-funded ventures “deliver
products later than expected” and 33% of projects had yet to deliver the
promised product at all.232 Another study by CNN Money shows that 84% of
the 50 most-funded projects on Kickstarter missed their target delivery dates233
because of manufacturing obstacles, logistics issues, and regulatory
certification roadblocks.234 The Pebble Watch and several other high-profile,
226

See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 273–75 and accompanying text.
228 See Perry-Smith & Vincent, supra note 217, at 36 (noting that high-tech startups routinely confront
“technology challenges that stem from the novelty and uncertainty associated with the technology itself”).
229 See, e.g., John Koetsier, Pebble’s Lead Designer ‘Stuck in Asia’ to Get the 21st Century E-paper
Watch Built, VENTURE BEAT (Oct. 11, 2012, 2:51 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2012/10/11/pebbles-leaddesigner-stuck-in-asia-to-get-the-21st-century-e-paper-watch-built/.
230 Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, J. BUS. VENTURING
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 11), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.06.005.
231 Id. (manuscript at 12).
232 Id. (manuscript at 1–2, 12).
233 Julianne Pepitone, Why 84% of Kickstarter’s Top Projects Shipped Late, CNN MONEY (Dec. 18, 2012,
8:04 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/18/technology/innovation/kickstarter-ship-delay/index.html.
234 See Stacy Cowley et al., 9 Reasons Kickstarter Projects Ship Late, CNN MONEY (Dec. 19, 2012, 1:27
PM), http://money.cnn.com/gallery/technology/2012/12/18/kickstarter-ship-late/index.html?iid=EL.
227
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multimillion-dollar projects have been described in the press as “vaporware,” a
tech industry term that refers to a product announced to the public but never
actually released, or officially cancelled.235 One frequent Kickstarter funder,
Dustin Wood, complains that he has spent approximately $800 on a number of
different crowdfunding projects yet has “no products to account for it.”236
Professor Mollick believes that such delays and failures will continue in equity
crowdfunding and comments, “You will have many disappointed people.
You’ll have people backing things, most of which will go bad.”237 Of course,
the high development failure rate is not always solely the fault of the
entrepreneurs behind these startups, who are often capable and wellintentioned.238 Instead, a number of factors, including the difficulty of design,
testing, and manufacturing, problems with scaling up, and the capriciousness
of the market, hamper the commercialization process.239
Third, crowdfunded startups face greater liability exposure because
entrepreneurs’ unique psychology makes them more likely than established
company managers to make risky, overly optimistic assertions. In academia
and the public consciousness, entrepreneurs are intrinsically associated with
risk.240 John Stuart Mill, who brought the term “entrepreneur” into common
usage, even distinguished “entrepreneurs” from company “managers” based on
the additional “risk bearing” role of entrepreneurs.241 It is well known that
entrepreneurs risk their financial, psychic, and emotional well-being; career

235 See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, Kickstarter Warnings as Dreamy Projects Flounder, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD (Oct. 14, 2012, 9:15 AM), http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/digital-life-news/kickstarter-warningsas-dreamy-projects-flounder-20121005-2736b.html#ixzz29lFr6SES. Since the Pebble Watch started shipping
in late January 2013, it is no longer a “vaporware” product. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
236 Tim Bradshaw, Project Delays Anger Kickstarter Backers, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2012, 1:17 PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d34bada8-2ad1-11e2-802d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2SBNTGFDO.
237 See Krantz, supra note 9.
238 Professor Mollick’s study found that the “direct failure rate”—those who had refunded money or
stopped responding to backers—was “well below 5%,” despite the fact that Kickstarter does not have an
“enforcement mechanism to prevent con artists from using the system to raise funds for fake projects.” See
Mollick, supra note 230 (manuscript at 12). In September 2012, Kickstarter refined its policies, including
banning photorealistic product simulations and forcing project founders to disclose and highlight risks, in
response to these product delays. Bradshaw, supra note 236.
239 See Robert Prentice, Vaporware: Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real Antitrust Liability in a
Post-Chicago World, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 1175 (1996). Such development issues plague even the world’s
largest corporations, and vaporware claims have resulted in securities fraud lawsuits—primarily grounded in
Rule 10b-5 claims—against Apple, Microsoft, and several other corporations. See id. at 1253.
240 See Brian Wu & Anne Marie Knott, Entrepreneurial Risk and Market Entry, 52 MGMT. SCI. 1315,
1315–16 (2006).
241 Robert H. Brockhaus, Sr., Risk Taking Propensity of Entrepreneurs, 23 ACAD. MGMT. J. 509, 509
(1980).
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opportunities; and even family relations when they engage in a new business
venture, which historically has led scholars to describe entrepreneurs as
excessive risk-takers.242 Recent scholarship, such as writing by Professor Anne
Marie Knott and Brian Wu, presents a more nuanced view of entrepreneurial
risk-taking. Professor Knott and Wu posit that, while entrepreneurs display
classic risk aversion with respect to market demand uncertainty, entrepreneurs
exhibit overconfidence regarding their “own entrepreneurial ability.”243 That is
to say, entrepreneurs do not believe they are taking significant economic risks
because they are “overestimating their capability” in their risk calculations.244
This helps explain why entrepreneurs “all have rosy glasses through which
they view their business and their market.”245 According to Professor Knott
and Wu, entrepreneurs believe their superior abilities can translate a long-shot
idea—at least as viewed from an outside perspective—into the next
Facebook.246
Of course, overestimating one’s own ability can be positive, encouraging
entrepreneurs to risk their life savings (and often the savings of their families
and friends) on the next big venture, at least a few of which will succeed
wildly. Before signing the JOBS Act, President Obama praised risk-taking
among American entrepreneurs:
We think big. We take risks. And we believe that anyone with a solid
plan and a willingness to work hard can turn even the most
improbable idea into a successful business. So ours is a legacy of
Edisons and Graham Bells, Fords and Boeings, of Googles and of
Twitters. This is a country that’s always been on the cutting edge.
And the reason is that America has always had the most daring
247
entrepreneurs in the world.

242

See id. at 510–11.
Wu & Knott, supra note 240, at 1315.
244 See id. at 1317. For example, when engineers in “entrepreneurial firms” were asked to fill out a selfassessment comparing their abilities to those of their peers, 42% of the engineers surveyed believed they were
in the top 5% of peer performance and 73.3% believed they were in the top 10% of peer performance. Id.
(“Thus, while all engineers are prone to overconfidence, those drawn to start-ups are particularly
overconfident.”).
245 Telephone Interview with Brian Batchelor, supra note 90; accord Carmen Nobel, Why Companies
Fail—and How Their Founders Can Bounce Back, HARV. BUS. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6591.html (“[S]tubborn entrepreneurs continue to found companies, in spite of the
failure rates . . . . Sometimes this is due to naïveté and hubris—the notion that their idea simply cannot fail.”).
246 See supra notes 243–44 and accompanying text.
247 Obama, supra note 111.
243
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Such entrepreneurial ventures are critical to the country’s economic growth.248
However, risk-taking based on an inflation of one’s own likelihood of success
is exactly the type of risk-taking that is likely to lead to overconfident
projections that fall outside of the Securities Act’s safe harbor for forwardlooking statements.249 Thus, crowdfunded startups run by entrepreneurs with
this mindset will confront substantially greater liability risk than companies
run by comparatively conservative managers.
Fourth, crowdfunded startups face greater liability exposure because
Section 4A(c) significantly broadens the scope of communications that may
trigger civil liability for issuers.250 Post-Gustafson judicial discussions of
Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) frequently refer to the “interrorem [sic] nature of the
liability” of these sections.251 These cases justify the “stringent standard of
liability”252 imposed on issuers because public offering materials are formal
documents intended for public reliance; thus, issuers bear a “moral
responsibility to the public [that] is particularly heavy.”253 Liability for
material misstatements and omissions under Section 4A(c)’s “any written or
oral communication” standard will clearly attach to the formal disclosures
distributed to the public and the SEC.254 However, Section 4A(c), at least on its
face, appears to cover other informal statements and communications to the
public—to the extent such communication is permitted under the SEC’s final
rules—since the phrase “any written or oral communication, in the offering or
sale of a security” is not limited to formal statements filed with the SEC.255
Formal disclosures to the SEC and the public are already substantial and
provide ample room for misstatement and omissions even without the
extension of liability for promotional statements under 4A(c).256
248

See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
For example, a projection or forward-looking statement does not fall within the Securities Act’s “safe
harbor” if the “statement was made or reaffirmed without a reasonable basis.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2012);
Prentice, supra note 239, at 1252–53. The “reasonable basis” requirement could be challenged in
circumstances of unrealistically overconfident projections.
250 See supra notes 181–88 and accompanying text.
251 See, e.g., In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d Cir. 2010).
252 See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1983) (“[Section 11] was designed to
assure compliance with the disclosure provisions of the Act by imposing a stringent standard of liability on the
parties who play a direct role in a registered offering.” (footnote omitted)).
253 See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 581 (1995) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73–85, at 9 (1933)).
254 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306, 317–19
(2012).
255 See id.
256 See Hanks, supra note 95 (“The disclosure requirements will be unfamiliar to small companies that
may be entering the capital markets for the first time and they are likely to make inadvertent mistakes.”).
249
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Fifth, crowdfunded offerings involve a unique blend of customer marketing
and investor pitching, which is likely to open issuers to additional liability if
promotional statements fall within Section 4A(c).257 A crowdfunding startup is
seeking not just financing from the crowd, but also the establishment of a
customer base to promote its product.258 This dual purpose means that
entrepreneurs need to show more than just the startup’s financial statements
and business plan, as required by the Crowdfund Act.259 Instead, entrepreneurs
need to convince hundreds of potential investors to also become customers.260
The notable difference between this pitch and a securities marketing road
show261 is that, in crowdfunding, these pitches will target unsophisticated retail
investors instead of the institutional investors, money managers, and brokerage
firms typically courted during road shows.262 In rewards-based crowdfunding,
this sales pitch often takes the form of a marketing video.263 Since liability for
inaccurate representations under Section 4A(c) on its face attaches to “any
written or oral communication” as discussed above, liability may very well
attach to all online and video promotions related to selling the security, at least
to the extent the SEC rules permit such promotional material. Companies are
more likely to make predictions and representations on websites and in videos
that they would not make in print and certainly would not make in a
prospectus.264 Potentially even more problematic is that entrepreneurs will
likely attempt to promote their offerings through social media platforms, which

257 Even if promotional statements do not fall within Section 4A(c), this environment creates a risk of
triggering Rule 10b-5 liability for issuers and funding portals. See id. (“It is easy to imagine the type of
promotional statements that inexperienced funding portals might make that would form the basis for a 10b-5
suit.”).
258 See Slava Rubin, The Wisdom of Crowdfunding, FORBES, Oct. 22, 2012, at 62.
259 See supra notes 144, 150 and accompanying text.
260 In some ways, this is a more difficult sale than pitching to angel investors or venture capital firms
where the entrepreneur simply needs to convince the investor that customers exist regardless of whether the
investor sees himself or herself as a customer.
261 A “road show” may occur before a large securities offering, such as an IPO, to drum up interest among
investors. See CRAIG F. ARCELLA, THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF ROAD SHOWS 1 (2010), http://www.cravath.com/
files/Uploads/Documents/The%20Nuts%20and%20Bolts%20of%20Road%20Shows%20(5-502-2419).pdf.
During a road show, the issuer’s senior management and its lead underwriters make presentations to potential
investors. Id.
262 See id.
263 On Kickstarter, for example, projects featuring videos “succeed [at raising funds] at a much higher rate
than those without.” Making Your Video, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/help/school#making_
your_video (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
264 See Prentice, supra note 175, at 33.
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currently form the backbone of crowdfunding solicitation efforts.265 Even these
casual communications could result in Section 4A(c) liability since they are
written communications.266 Of course, the likelihood of counsel reviewing all
these communications in a crowdfunding setting is slim, given the cost of such
review and the relatively small amount of money being raised in a
crowdfunded offering.
Sixth, misleading statements, omissions, and overly optimistic assertions
are less likely to be caught and rooted out in crowdfunding than in traditional
financing because of the minimal level of due diligence that will likely be
undertaken in crowdfunded offerings.267 If, as posited above, entrepreneurs
skew expected return calculations and omit certain risks based on
overconfidence in their own performance, these skewed returns and omissions
will inevitably appear in risk disclosure statements, business plans, and
financial projections. When angel investors and venture capital firms receive
business plans and financial projections, they take a closer, skeptical look
during the due diligence process.268 Sophisticated investors expect
overstatements and anticipate finding material mistakes and misstatements
during due diligence.269 However, crowdfunding does not present the same
opportunity for thorough due diligence on the part of investors. Crowdfunding
investors will rely either on the issuer’s sales pitch or, at best, on the issuer’s
disclosed financials and projections, without the ability to conduct their own
due diligence.270 Several scholars and legal practitioners question the extent to
which these financial disclosures will actually benefit retail investors since
265 Telephone Interview with Jim Cummings, Member, Ornana, LLC (Sept. 27, 2012) (explaining how he
used social media platforms, including Facebook and “anything else [he] could” to promote his campaign).
Professor Mollick’s Kickstarter results study also demonstrates the value of social media connections. See
Mollick, supra note 230 (manuscript at 8) (“To take an average project in the Film category, a founder with 10
Facebook friends would have a 9% chance of succeeding, one with 100 friends would have a 20% chance of
success, and one with 1000 friends would have a 40% chance of success.”).
266 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306, 317, 319
(2012). It is currently unclear to what extent issuers will be able to promote their offerings through
promotional materials or social media. The Crowdfund Act currently states that issuers shall “not advertise the
terms of the offering, except for notices which direct investors to the funding portal or broker.” Id. at 318.
267 See Daniel Isenberg, The Road to Crowdfunding Hell, HBR BLOG NETWORK (Apr. 23, 2012, 10:57
AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2012/04/the_road_to_crowdfunding_hell.html (arguing that due diligence is too
expensive for crowdfunding).
268 “A lot of what entrepreneurs disclose may or may not be 100% accurate. . . . It takes a lot of time and a
lot of specific knowledge to drill down to what is realistic.” Telephone Interview with Brian Batchelor, supra
note 90.
269 See id. (“Groups like the ATA and sophisticated angels and venture capital firms cut to the chase
because they have seen this standard entrepreneur optimism a million times and they know what to do.”).
270 See infra notes 273–77 and accompanying text.
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many, if not most, retail investors will either not understand these documents
or not bother reading them.271 The concern around the lack of due diligence is
so strong that several businesses, including CrowdCheck, Crowdfunding
Roadmap, and CrowdQualifier, have sprouted to offer due diligence services
for issuers and crowdfunding intermediaries.272 However, these due diligence
services are unlikely to be as thorough as those conducted by sophisticated
investors because of the time and cost involved in high-quality due
diligence.273 Venture capital firms may spend upwards of $50,000 on due
diligence before committing funds to a startup,274 and angel investor groups
perform an average of sixty hours on due diligence before investing.275 Since
crowdfunding will involve smaller sums of money, especially in comparison to
venture capital investing, and because issuers will ultimately have to foot the
bill for due diligence,276 expensive and lengthy due diligence is not practical.277
This financial reality increases the likelihood that material mistakes will not be
unearthed—mistakes that may come back to haunt issuers under Section 4A(c)
if the startup flounders or fails.
2. The Likelihood of Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Bringing Suit Under 4A(c)
Despite Section 4A(c)’s minimal elements, the Crowdfund Act’s liability
provision is at risk of providing investors a right without an effective remedy
unless attorney fee-shifting is instituted as this Comment proposes. The small
dollar amounts in a crowdfunded offering may well render the liability section
ineffective because no single individual is likely to have a sufficient

271 See Bradford, supra note 64, at 112 (writing that “at least some of the people investing in
crowdfunding offerings will not have the basic financial knowledge required to understand the risks” even if
disclosed); Wroldsen, supra note 11, at 605 (writing that a disclosure’s “effectiveness in helping investors,
especially unsophisticated ones, judge the quality of securities offerings is questionable”); Sullivan & Ma,
supra note 218 (“Typical crowdfunding investors, even with basic disclosure requirements for participation,
won’t have the investment savvy to determine whether an investment is real or a fraud.”).
272 See CROWDCHECK, http://www.crowdcheck.com/about-us (last visited Aug. 13, 2013);
CROWDFUNDING ROADMAP, http://www.crowdfundingroadmap.com/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2013);
CROWDQUALIFIER, http://www.crowdqualifier.com/home (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
273 See Isenberg, supra note 267.
274 See id.
275 See ROBERT WILTBANK & WARREN BOEKER, RETURNS TO ANGEL INVESTORS IN GROUPS 5 (2007).
Venture capitalists may spend several months conducting due diligence. Id.
276 Even if some funding portals cover the up-front cost of due diligence, this cost will ultimately be
passed along to the issuer in higher hosting fees.
277 Isenberg, supra note 267.
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investment to pursue litigation.278 Under the Crowdfund Act, an individual
with an annual income or net worth of less than $100,000 can invest the greater
of $2,000 or 5% of the individual’s income or net worth; if the investor’s
annual income or net worth is equal to or greater than $100,000, the investment
is capped at 10% of the individual’s annual income or net worth, not to exceed
$100,000.279 The limited dollar amount essentially necessitates filing a class
action suit that pools together investor claims.280 However, even as a class
action suit, the sum of money at issue is so small that attorneys will have to
anticipate reaching a quick settlement before trial in order to justify even the
pretrial costs of the litigation.
The vast majority of security lawsuits are filed as class actions in order to
balance the costs of the litigation against the potential awards to the class.281
However, crowdfunding presents a much smaller investment pool than other
financing rounds, such as IPOs, because the Crowdfund Act caps offerings at
$1 million in any twelve-month period.282 Attorney Lyndon Tretter worries
that “even the aggregate amount of investments [in a crowdfunded offering]
may not be enough to attract plaintiffs’ class-action counsel to take the case on
a contingency-fee basis.”283 Plaintiffs’ attorneys must incur the up-front
expenses of litigation in hopes of securing an award that offsets the cost of
litigation, while these attorneys can hope to recover 30% of the award.284 In
this calculation, plaintiffs’ attorneys must also discount both for the likelihood
of losing in court and for the time value of money until the award is secured.285
As a result of this calculation, a substantial sum of money is required to
motivate lawyers to bring suit. One study on IPOs asserted that “‘smaller sized
278 See Hazen, supra note 20, at 1759 (writing that there are “questions regarding the economics of
bringing such a claim and the adequacy of the economic incentives to plaintiff’s law firms to bring suit on a
contingent fee basis”).
279 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012).
Although it remains to be seen, it seems unlikely that an investor would invest anywhere near $100,000
because such an investor could invest as an angel and negotiate more favorable terms.
280 See Sullivan & Ma, supra note 218.
281 See HICKS, supra note 203, § 6:48 (“The securities laws are complex; actions under them are
expensive. Without a class action, many actionable wrongs would go uncorrected and uncompensated.”
(quoting Gibb v. Delta Drilling Co., 104 F.R.D. 59, 71 (N.D. Tex. 1984))).
282 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302(a). By comparison, the median IPO deal size in 2012
measured $124 million and $160.2 million in 2011. Tomio Geron, IPO Market Raises $43B in 2012, but
Median Deal Size Down 23%, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/
2012/12/18/ipo-market-raises-43m-in-2012-but-median-deal-size-down-23/.
283 Tretter, supra note 20.
284 1 ALBA CONTE, ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS § 2:8 (“[C]ommon-fund fees in complex class action and
shareholder derivative suits normally constitute 20 to 30% of the class recovery . . . .”).
285 Coffee, supra note 166, at 1543.
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offerings hardly ever experience a securities-fraud lawsuit,’” noting that less
than 1% of offerings below $5 million resulted in a class action lawsuit.286
Another study asserted that a threshold of $20 million in damages must be
available to “make the class action economically attractive to plaintiffs’
attorneys.”287 Because the maximum recovery under the Crowdfund Act is
approximately $1 million, the economics of bringing a class action are
questionable; but the possibility of litigation should not be ruled out entirely
because attorneys may bring individual or class action suits in anticipation of a
quick settlement.288
The minimal burdens Section 4A(c) imposes on plaintiffs may propel a
rash of suits filed in anticipation of a quick settlement—suits that may or may
not have any merit. In 1995 Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA) to reduce the “routine filing” of frivolous or
nonmeritorious suits brought for their settlement value,289 commonly referred
to as “strike suits.”290 However, Section 12(a)(2) claims alleging negligence
and not fraud are not subject to the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards.291
As a result, plaintiffs need not “state with particularity all facts”292 on which
their belief in a securities violation is founded.293 Presumably, Section 4A(c)
cases will likewise be exempt from the heightened pleading standard, which
means that plaintiffs can proceed without particularized evidence of misleading
statements and force defendants to undergo expensive discovery.294
Additionally, the defenses to Section 4A(c) liability—reasonable care and
negative loss causation—are both affirmative defenses, meaning the defendant
will bear the burden—and costs—of proving these in court.295 Before
crowdfunding has even legally commenced, there are already “strike suit

286

Id.
Id. at 1544 n.28.
288 See Sullivan & Ma, supra note 218 (“[C]rowdfunding will lead to, perhaps, one Google and thousands
of Friendsters. And plenty of lawsuits.”).
289 See Coffee, supra note 166, at 1534 n.1 (quoting H.R. REP NO. 104–369, at 31 (1995)).
290 See William S. Feinstein, Pleading Securities Fraud with Particularity—Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) in the Rule 10b-5 Context: Kowal v. MCI Communications Corporation, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 851, 864 (1995).
291 See Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2004).
292 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2012).
293 See Rombach, 355 F.3d at 170–71.
294 See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 166, at 6 (stating that Congress enacted the PSLRA to prevent
strike suits that threatened defendant corporations with “costly discovery”).
295 See supra notes 205–10 and accompanying text.
287
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lawyer advertisements on the internet,” which suggests that plaintiffs’ lawyers
have not overlooked this opportunity for a quick payout.296
Of course, claims brought under Section 4A(c) may have merit, especially
given that its express cause of action presents such a minimal hurdle for
plaintiffs. Another parallel to IPOs is helpful. Consider that companies going
public may spend several hundred thousand dollars preparing the prospectus
and registration statements.297 Despite the cost and careful preparation of these
materials, many of these companies, especially high-tech companies, are sued
in a class action or derivative suit shortly after their IPO.298 Groupon and
Facebook provide illustrative examples. A lawsuit filed against Groupon
pointed to its “material weakness in internal controls” that, if true, potentially
resulted in false and misleading statements in its registration statement and
prospectus.299 After Facebook’s dismal IPO in May 2012, investors filed fortytwo securities lawsuits against Facebook, alleging it misrepresented its
financial condition prior to its IPO.300 These suits inevitably arise because
IPOs are “the most attractive kind of suit for the plaintiff’s bar,” according to
Columbia Law Professor John Coffee.301 Since crowdfunding offers share
many of the same characteristics as IPOs—aside from the monetary value of
the offering—they may likewise be very attractive to the plaintiff’s bar.302
Although the past frequency of such suits is not a guarantee of the frequency of
crowdfunding litigation, it at least indicates that plaintiffs’ attorneys will be
looking closely at the potential benefits of bringing a suit under Section 4A(c),
which means issuers must factor this cost into their crowdfunding transaction
calculations. As discussed in the next section, providing fee-shifting for
plaintiffs’ attorneys successful at trial on the merits will motivate attorneys to
pursue cases that might not otherwise make financial sense, thus ensuring
investors a more effective remedy under Section 4A(c).

296 See Jeff Koeppel, Singing in the Rain, CROWD FUNDING NEWS (Dec. 24, 2012), http://jeffkoeppel.
wordpress.com/2012/12/24/singing-in-the-rain/.
297 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
298 See Johnson, supra note 24 (“[A] rite of passage for any publicly traded tech company is its first
securities class action or derivative suit.”).
299 See Sam Gustin, Groupon Faces SEC Probe, Investor Lawsuit as Stock Hits New Low, TIME (Apr. 5,
2012),
http://business.time.com/2012/04/05/groupon-faces-SEC-probe-investor-lawsuit-as-stock-hits-newlow/.
300 Nate Raymond, Judge Names Lead Plaintiffs in Facebook Litigation, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS &
INSIGHT (Dec. 6, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/SECurities/News/2012/12_-_December/
Judge_names_lead_plaintiffs_in_Facebook_litigation/.
301 Aaron Lucchetti, Facebook’s Next Fight: Suits, and More Suits, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2012, at C1.
302 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESS AND ISSUERS
Given the overly broad liability sweep of Section 4A(c), its cost
implications, and the potentially ineffective remedy it provides to investors,
Congress must revise the Crowdfund Act’s overbearing liability provision.
This possibility is not as far-fetched as one might initially believe, especially
when considering Congress’s frustration at the SEC over the delay in
rulemaking.303 If Congress picks up the pencil to complete rulemaking, it
should take the opportunity to revisit Section 4A(c) as well.304 This Part
provides a prescriptive solution for redrafting Section 4A(c) that balances
investor protection from fraud and issuer liability exposure.
As discussed in Part III.B, the negligence-like standard of care imposed by
Section 4A(c) imposes draconian liability on issuers.305 This level of care is
difficult—if not impossible—to achieve even for more mature companies
undergoing IPOs with far greater sums of money to expend on attorneys and
accountants.306 For many startups and emerging companies with limited
financial resources, the disclosure requirements and hidden transaction costs
will make crowdfunding unsustainable for the very companies the
crowdfunding legislation was intended to benefit.307 This Comment addresses
this problem by proposing a redraft of Section 4A(c) to require issuer scienter,
while simultaneously providing a fee-shifting provision for plaintiffs’ attorneys
who are successful on the merits at trial. This simple rebalancing of Section
4A(c) will lower issuer liability exposure and transaction costs but will also
maintain investor protection from fraud and the integrity of the market.

303 See Letter from Senator Jeff Merkley et al., to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC (Dec. 10, 2012),
available at http://www.merkley.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=911718cf-ad8b-4f66-8455-8cad
3960f51d (“The law directed the SEC to promulgate the necessary rules within 270 days of the enactment of
the Act. . . . At this point, it will be difficult to complete the rules by the deadline in the Act, but the SEC
should move expeditiously to attempt to do so.”).
304 Sara Hanks, a former SEC attorney, notes that congressional legislation already supplanted SEC
rulemaking once in the JOBS Act when Congress altered Section 12(g) registration triggers, and that “[i]t is
not impossible that the drafting pencil could be seized from the Commission’s hands again.” Hanks, supra
note 95. At the same time, Congress is not always known for fixing what it may consider a minor detail. See
William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going Private,” 55 EMORY
L.J. 141, 160 n.109 (2006) (noting the fact that Congress “will not rethink its choices” regarding the SarbanesOxley Act despite criticism from the Act’s author).
305 See supra Part III.B.
306 See supra notes 298–302 and accompanying text.
307 See supra Part II.
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Although Rule 10b-5 will apply to crowdfunding transactions,308 the
heightened risk of fraud in online crowdfunding warrants a new liability
provision, albeit not one as oppressive as Section 4A(c). The PSLRA
requirement that plaintiffs have certain facts in hand before trial when alleging
Rule 10b-5 claims309—coupled with the burden of proving the six elements of
Rule 10b-5 and the small sums of money in play—will likely minimize the
effectiveness of Rule 10b-5 for defrauded investors. Even in securities fraud
cases with much higher monetary stakes than in crowdfunding, many people
worry that PSLRA requirements are preventing legitimate lawsuits as well as
frivolous ones.310 Although this Comment proposes that scienter—carrying its
standard meaning of recklessness311 or deliberateness—should be added as an
element of Section 4A(c) to be proved by the plaintiff, the heightened PSLRA
pleading standard should not apply to Section 4A(c) claims because this barrier
could prevent the plaintiff from advancing to discovery to unearth fraud. This
compromise revision of Section 4A(c) provides several benefits: lowering the
issuer’s transaction costs, focusing litigation on fraudulent issuers, avoiding
PSLRA’s hurdles, and reducing the likelihood of strike suits.
First, this revision helps lower the up-front and hidden transaction costs of
crowdfunding. The role of the SEC is to mandate disclosure and to remedy the
information asymmetry between issuer and investor without choking off the
market’s utility.312 However, as noted, the Crowdfund Act currently risks
creating burdens disproportionate to the Act’s benefits.313 The likelihood of
making a material misstatement or omission in a crowdfunded offering is
extremely high.314 This risk increases the need for attorneys and further raises
the costs of using crowdfunding. Concededly, adding a scienter requirement to
Section 4A(c)’s liability standard might let some issuers avoid liability for
negligence. However, allowing issuers to avoid some limited liability is a
308

See Hanks, supra note 95; supra note 37 and accompanying text.
See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
913, 925 (2003); supra notes 291–92 and accompanying text.
310 See Jane Bryant Quinn, Madoff Victims Face Grim Prospects in Court, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=columnist_quinn&sid=axkhffRnncpI
(discussing how the PSLRA acts as a barrier to recovery for victims of Bernard Madoff scam); see also Perino,
supra note 309, at 926 & nn.73–75.
311 “Recklessness” is “‘an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care to the extent that the
danger was either known to the defendant or was so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.’”
In re Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting S. Cherry St., LLC, v.
Hennessee Grp., LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2009)).
312 See Johnson, supra note 24.
313 See supra Part II.
314 See supra Part III.B.1.
309
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trade-off warranted by the economic benefits of potentially plugging the
startup capital funding gap.315
Additionally, this proposed revision to Section 4A(c) will help focus
recovery efforts on the most culpable issuers—those actually engaging in clear
and demonstrable fraud.316 Under Section 4A(c), as presently written, a
plaintiff’s attorney is just as likely to bring a case against an issuer that
carelessly mistranscribes a decimal in its financial statements as against an
issuer that deliberately cooks its financial statements. The addition of scienter
as an element of Section 4A(c) will concentrate litigation against the latter—
the issuers that intentionally or recklessly abuse crowdfunding and damage the
market’s integrity. Next, by eschewing the PSLRA’s heightened pleading
standard, this revision would allow plaintiffs to more readily survive a motion
to dismiss and proceed to discovery, where evidence of fraud could be
unearthed. Finally, this change would reduce the potential likelihood of suits
filed in anticipation of a quick settlement, because plaintiffs’ attorneys would
face the hurdle of proving scienter and not mere negligence.
In addition to requiring scienter for material misstatements or omissions,
Section 4A(c) should permit attorney fee-shifting for the prevailing party at
trial on the merits of the case, such as is done in civil rights cases.317 If
patterned after attorney fee-shifting in civil rights cases, the revised Section
4A(c) would allow either party to win attorney’s fees, although civil rights
precedent favors recovery by the plaintiff rather than the defendant.318 This
revision would provide defrauded plaintiffs with a more robust remedy since
the economic incentives of litigating a class action suit under Section 4A(c) are
questionable at best.319 Permitting fee-shifting would alter the calculations
made by plaintiffs’ attorneys. Instead of being deterred by the limited size of
the award, attorneys could concentrate on the likelihood of success because
315

See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.B.
To further this end, plaintiffs’ attorneys and the courts should first look to culpable corporate insiders
for the payment of any judgment instead of initially seeking recovery from the corporation, which would just
impoverish the remaining shareholders. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for
Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 719 (1992) (discussing how
enterprise liability for securities fraud “simply replaces one group of innocent victims with another” while “a
large percentage of the plaintiffs’ recovery goes to their lawyers”).
317 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006).
318 See Mark R. Brown, A Primer on the Law of Attorney’s Fees Under § 1988, 37 URB. LAW. 663, 664
(2005) (“A prevailing defendant can win attorney’s fees under § 1988 only if it can prove that a plaintiff’s
claim is frivolous, groundless, or vexatious.”). Allowing recovery by the defendant in such situations would
further discourage strike suits.
319 See supra Part III.B.2.
316
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they would receive adequate compensation if they won on the merits at trial.320
The court could base the awarded fee on a lodestar calculation that multiplies
hours expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate, and then adjust the
result based on other pertinent factors, such as the experience of counsel,
novelty of the questions, and the “undesirability” of the case.321
This fee-shifting provision would place some issuers on the hook for far
more money than under Section 4A(c) in its current form, which provides only
for rescission of funds plus interest upon a tendering of the plaintiff’s
securities.322 However, holding fraudulent issuers accountable for plaintiffs’
attorney fees may additionally deter would-be fraudulent issuers, especially
those issuers who would be willing to commit fraud when the most likely civil
repercussion is simply returning the raised funds.323 Of course, instituting feeshifting may deter legitimate issuers from using crowdfunding as well.
However, the deterrent effect should not be as great on legitimate issuers
contemplating crowdfunding because the addition of scienter to Section 4A(c)
will shield issuers from liability if they simply commit a beginner’s mistake
sans scienter.
Until these issues with Section 4A(c) are revisited by Congress or attended
to by the SEC or the courts, issuers need to be aware of this hidden liability
trap and factor it into their crowdfunding cost calculations. In particular,
startups and high-tech companies—those companies facing the highest risk of
making a material misstatement or omission324—should think twice before
using crowdfunding. What initially seems a fast and easy form of financing
may quickly unravel into costly and time-consuming litigation.

320 If the defendant settles the case, any fees should come from the common fund and not through attorney
fee-shifting to avoid encouraging strike suits.
321 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An
Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 30–31 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
authors also note several potential problems with this form of calculation, although an in-depth discussion of
these issues lies outside the scope of this Comment. Id. at 31.
322 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302, 126 Stat. 306, 315, 318 (2012).
323 Of course, the SEC and state enforcement agencies can also levy monetary sanctions and suspensions
against fraudulent issuers. However, statistics show that from 2000 to 2002, private action awards amounted to
more than twice those imposed by the SEC and more than all those imposed by the SEC, state regulatory
authorities, the National Association of Securities Dealers Exchange, and the New York Stock Exchange
combined. See Coffee, supra note 166, at 1542.
324 See supra Part III.B.1.
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CONCLUSION
Crowdfunding poses the potential for the most significant shake-up and
democratization of the investment industry in decades. For the first time,
nearly every American adult will be able to invest in startups, once a privilege
largely reserved to the fewer than four million accredited investors in the
United States.325 Of course the positives should not be overstated. When
unsophisticated investors meet unsophisticated issuers, there will be investor
losses and there will be fraudulent offerings.326 But fraudulent offerings and
investor losses already occur in the public and private markets.327
The key to this grand experiment is balancing investor protection from
fraud and the burdens of issuing a crowdfunded offering. The up-front
transaction costs of attorneys and accountants to prepare disclosure statements
that comply with SEC regulations, plus the fees owed to funding portals, will
consume a substantial portion of the $1 million maximum that can be raised.328
Even more significant are crowdfunding’s hidden costs, including the
administrative cost of managing shareholders, the deterrent effect of numerous
shareholders on later rounds of investment, and, most critically, the potential
liability costs under Section 4A(c) down the road.
Section 4A(c) of the Crowdfund Act sweeps too broadly for the
crowdfunding environment and will ensnare unsophisticated entrepreneurs in
its trap. The liability provision’s minimal elements—merely proving a material
misrepresentation or omission that makes a stated fact misleading—coupled
with the expansion of Section 12(a)(2)’s language to include “any written or
oral communication”329 will impose draconian liability on unsuspecting
issuers. The problems with this liability provision are further exacerbated by
the dynamics of startups using crowdfunding: young companies statistically
likely to fail, emerging technology issues, entrepreneurial predisposition to
risk, broad mediums of communication, a unique form of investor pitching,
and a lack of thorough due diligence by the crowd.330
As a new, unprecedented form of financing, crowdfunding likewise
deserves a new liability provision, not a rehashing of a liability provision
325
326
327
328
329
330

Wagner, supra note 58.
See supra notes 20, 39 and accompanying text.
See Johnson, supra note 28, at 995, 1009; Bishop, supra note 220.
See supra Part II.
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302, 126 Stat. 306, 315, 319 (2012).
See supra Part III.B.1.
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intended for companies undertaking a high-priced public offering with the
assistance of a small army of attorneys, accountants, and investment
professionals. Moreover, crowdfunding deserves a liability provision that
actually addresses the risk of securities fraud, not beginners’ reporting
mistakes. Congress should revise Section 4A(c) to require the plaintiff to prove
scienter in the untrue statement or omission rather than only allowing the
issuer to prove reasonable care or negative loss causation as affirmative
defenses. The redrafted provision should also permit attorney fee-shifting to
justify the costs of plaintiffs’ attorneys pursuing class action litigation over a
relatively small sum of money in order to provide defrauded investors with an
effective remedy. These corrections will focus the liability provision on those
issuers committing fraud—the ostensible concern of lawmakers and
regulators—instead of extending liability to cover the inevitable mistakes
inexperienced entrepreneurs will make in crowdfunded offerings. These
revisions will also drive down the transaction costs of crowdfunding by
reducing the need for attorneys to vet every statement and lessening the risk of
civil liability springing up down the road. Ultimately, this Comment’s proposal
would balance securities regulations to protect investors and the integrity of the
market, while keeping transaction costs low enough to allow this revolutionary
experiment an opportunity to develop.
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